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Artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities are growing 
at an unprecedented rate. These technologies have many widely 
beneficial applications, ranging from machine translation to medical 
image analysis. Countless more such applications are being 
developed and can be expected over the long term. Less attention 
has historically been paid to the ways in which artificial intelligence 
can be used maliciously.  This report surveys the landscape of 
potential security threats from malicious uses of artificial intelligence 
technologies, and proposes ways to better forecast, prevent, and 
mitigate these threats. We analyze, but do not conclusively resolve, 
the question of what the long-term equilibrium between attackers and 
defenders will be. We focus instead on what sorts of attacks we are 
likely to see soon if adequate defenses are not developed.
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In response to the changing threat landscape we make four high-level 
recommendations:
1. Policymakers should collaborate closely with technical 
researchers to investigate, prevent, and mitigate potential 
malicious uses of AI.
2. Researchers and engineers in artificial intelligence should take 
the dual-use nature of their work seriously, allowing misuse-
related considerations to influence research priorities and 
norms, and proactively reaching out to relevant actors when 
harmful applications are foreseeable.
3. Best practices should be identified in research areas with more 
mature methods for addressing dual-use concerns, such as 
computer security, and imported where applicable to the case 
of AI.
4. Actively seek to expand the range of stakeholders and domain 
experts involved in discussions of these challenges.
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As AI capabilities become more powerful and widespread, we expect 
the growing use of AI systems to lead to the following changes in the 
landscape of threats:  
• Expansion of existing threats. The costs of attacks may be 
lowered by the scalable use of AI systems to complete tasks 
that would ordinarily require human labor, intelligence and 
expertise. A natural effect would be to expand the set of actors 
who can carry out particular attacks, the rate at which they can 
carry out these attacks, and the set of potential targets. 
• Introduction of new threats. New attacks may arise through the 
use of AI systems to complete tasks that would be otherwise 
impractical for humans. In addition, malicious actors may 
exploit the vulnerabilities of AI systems deployed by defenders. 
• Change to the typical character of threats. We believe there is 
reason to expect attacks enabled by the growing use of AI to 
be especially effective, finely targeted, difficult to attribute, 
and likely to exploit vulnerabilities in AI systems. 
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We structure our analysis by separately considering three security 
domains, and illustrate possible changes to threats within these 
domains through representative examples:
• Digital security. The use of AI to automate tasks involved in 
carrying out cyberattacks will alleviate the existing tradeoff 
between the scale and efficacy of attacks. This may expand 
the threat associated with labor-intensive cyberattacks 
(such as spear phishing). We also expect novel attacks that 
exploit human vulnerabilities (e.g. through the use of speech 
synthesis for impersonation), existing software vulnerabilities 
(e.g. through automated hacking), or the vulnerabilities 
of AI systems (e.g. through adversarial examples and data 
poisoning).
• Physical security. The use of AI to automate tasks involved in 
carrying out attacks with drones and other physical systems 
(e.g. through the deployment of autonomous weapons 
systems) may expand the threats associated with these 
attacks. We also expect novel attacks that subvert cyber-
physical systems (e.g. causing autonomous vehicles to crash) 
or involve physical systems that it would be infeasible to direct 
remotely (e.g. a swarm of thousands of micro-drones).
• Political security. The use of AI to automate tasks involved in 
surveillance (e.g. analysing mass-collected data), persuasion 
(e.g. creating targeted propaganda), and deception (e.g. 
manipulating videos) may expand threats associated with 
privacy invasion and social manipulation. We also expect novel 
attacks that take advantage of an improved capacity to analyse 
human behaviors, moods, and beliefs on the basis of available 
data.  These concerns are most significant in the context of 
authoritarian states, but may also undermine the ability of 
democracies to sustain truthful public debates. 
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In addition to the high-level recommendations listed above, we also 
propose the exploration of several open questions and potential 
interventions within four priority research areas:
• Learning from and with the cybersecurity community. At the 
intersection of cybersecurity and AI attacks, we highlight 
the need to explore and potentially implement red teaming, 
formal verification, responsible disclosure of AI vulnerabilities, 
security tools, and secure hardware.
• Exploring different openness models. As the dual-use nature 
of AI and ML becomes apparent, we highlight the need to 
reimagine norms and institutions around the openness of 
research, starting with pre-publication risk assessment in 
technical areas of special concern, central access licensing 
models, sharing regimes that favor safety and security, and 
other lessons from other dual-use technologies. 
• Promoting a culture of responsibility. AI researchers and the 
organisations that employ them are in a unique position to 
shape the security landscape of the AI-enabled world. We 
highlight the importance of education, ethical statements and 
standards, framings, norms, and expectations.
• Developing technological and policy solutions. In addition to 
the above, we survey a range of promising technologies, as 
well as policy interventions, that could help build a safer future 
with AI. High-level areas for further research include privacy 
protection, coordinated use of AI for public-good security, 
monitoring of AI-relevant resources, and other legislative and 
regulatory responses. 
The proposed interventions require attention and action not just from 
AI researchers and companies but also from legislators, civil servants, 
regulators, security researchers and educators. The challenge is 
daunting and the stakes are high.
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Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML)  have 
progressed rapidly in recent years, and their development has 
enabled a wide range of beneficial applications. For example, AI is a 
critical component of widely used technologies such as automatic 
speech recognition, machine translation, spam filters, and search 
engines. Additional promising technologies currently being 
researched or undergoing small-scale pilots include driverless 
cars, digital assistants for nurses and doctors, and AI-enabled 
drones for expediting disaster relief operations. Even further in the 
future, advanced AI holds out the promise of reducing the need 
for unwanted labor, greatly expediting scientific research, and 
improving the quality of governance. We are excited about many of 
these developments, though we also urge attention to the ways in 
which AI can be used maliciously . We analyze such risks in detail 
so that they can be prevented or mitigated, not just for the value of 
AI refers to the use of digital 
technology to create systems that are 
capable of performing tasks commonly 
thought to require intelligence. 
Machine learning is variously 
characterized as either a sub-
field of AI or a separate field, and 
refers to the development of digital 
systems that improve their performance 
on a given task over time through 
experience.
We define “malicious use” loosely, 
to include all practices that are 
intended to compromise the security 
of individuals, groups, or a society. 
Note that one could read much of 
our document under various possible 
perspectives on what constitutes 
malicious use, as the interventions 
and structural issues we discuss are 
fairly general.
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Introduction
preventing the associated harms, but also to prevent delays in the 
realization of the beneficial applications of AI.
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) are altering the 
landscape of security risks for citizens, organizations, and states. 
Malicious use of AI could threaten digital security (e.g. through 
criminals training machines to hack or socially engineer victims at 
human or superhuman levels of performance), physical security 
(e.g. non-state actors weaponizing consumer drones), and political 
security (e.g. through privacy-eliminating surveillance, profiling, 
and repression, or through automated and targeted disinformation 
campaigns). 
The malicious use of AI will impact how we construct and manage 
our digital infrastructure as well as how we design and distribute 
AI systems, and will likely require policy and other institutional 
responses. The question this report hopes to answer is: how can 
we forecast, prevent, and (when necessary) mitigate the harmful 
effects of malicious uses of AI? We convened a workshop at 
the University of Oxford on the topic in February 2017, bringing 
together experts on AI safety, drones , cybersecurity, lethal 
autonomous weapon systems, and counterterrorism . This 
document summarizes the findings of that workshop and our 
conclusions after subsequent research. 
Scope
For the purposes of this report, we only consider AI technologies 
that are currently available (at least as initial research and 
development demonstrations) or are plausible in the next 5 
years, and focus in particular on technologies leveraging machine 
learning. We only consider scenarios where an individual or an 
organisation deploys AI technology or compromises an AI system 
with an aim to undermine the security of another individual, 
organisation or collective. Our work fits into a larger body of work 
on the social implications of, and policy responses to, AI . There 
has thus far been more attention paid in this work to unintentional 
forms of AI misuse such as algorithmic bias , versus the intentional 
undermining of individual or group security that we consider. 
We exclude indirect threats to security from the current report, 
such as threats that could come from mass unemployment, or 
other second- or third-order effects from the deployment of 
AI technology in human society. We also exclude system-level 
threats that would come from the dynamic interaction between 
non-malicious actors, such as a “race to the bottom” on AI safety 
Not all workshop participants 
necessarily endorse all the findings 
discussed herein. See Appendix A for 
additional details on the workshop  
and research process underlying  
this report. 
We define drones as unmanned aerial 
robots, which may or may not have 
autonomous decision-making features.
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Introduction
between competing groups seeking an advantage  or conflicts 
spiraling out of control due to the use of ever-faster autonomous 
weapons. Such threats are real, important, and urgent, and  
require further study, but are beyond the scope of this document. 
Related Literature
Though the threat of malicious use of AI has been highlighted  
in high-profile settings (e.g. in a Congressional hearing  a White 
House-organized workshop , and a Department of Homeland 
Security report ), and particular risk scenarios have been analyzed 
(e.g. the subversion of military lethal autonomous weapon 
systems ), the intersection of AI and malicious intent writ large  
has not yet been analyzed comprehensively. 
Several literatures bear on the question of AI and security, including 
those on cybersecurity, drones, lethal autonomous weapons, 
“social media bots,” and terrorism. Another adjacent area of 
research is AI safety—the effort to ensure that AI systems reliably 
achieve the goals their designers and users intend without causing 
unintended harm . Whereas the AI safety literature focuses on 
unintended harms related to AI, we focus on the intentional use of 
AI to achieve harmful outcomes (from the victim’s point of view). A 
recent report  covers similar ground to our analysis, with  
a greater focus on the implications of AI for U.S. national security. 
In the remainder of the report, we first provide a high-level view  
on the nature of AI and its security implications in the section 
General Framework for AI and Security, with subsections on 
Capabilities, Security-relevant Properties of AI, and General 
Implications for the Security Landscape; we then illustrate these 
characteristics of AI with Scenarios in which AI systems could 
be used maliciously; we next analyze how AI may play out in the 
domains of digital, physical, and political security; we propose 
Interventions to better assess these risks, protect victims 
from attacks, and prevent malicious actors from accessing and 
deploying dangerous AI capabilities; and we conduct a Strategic 
Analysis of the “equilibrium” of a world in the medium-term (5+ 
years) after more sophisticated attacks and defenses have been 
implemented. Appendices A and B respectively discuss the 
workshop leading up to this report, and describe areas for research 
that might yield additional useful interventions.
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General
Framework
for AI  and
Security Threats
AI Capabilities
The field of AI aims at the automation of a broad range of tasks. 
Typical tasks studied by AI researchers include playing games, 
guiding vehicles, and classifying images. In principle, though, the 
set of tasks that could be transformed by AI is vast. At minimum, 
any task that humans or non-human animals use their intelligence 
to perform could be a target for innovation. 
While the field of artificial intelligence dates back to the 1950s, 
several years of rapid progress and growth have recently invested 
it with a greater and broader relevance. Researchers have achieved 
sudden performance gains at a number of their most commonly 
studied tasks.
Factors that help to explain these 
recent gains include the exponential 
growth of computing power, improved 
machine learning algorithms 
(especially in the area of deep 
neural networks), development of 
standard software frameworks for 
faster iteration and replication of 
experiments, larger and more widely 
available datasets, and expanded 
commercial investments (Jordan and 
Mitchell, 2015).
1
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Figure 1  illustrates this trend in the case of image recognition, 
where over the past half-decade the performance of the best AI 
systems has improved from correctly categorizing around 70% 
of images to near perfect categorization (98%), better than the 
human benchmark of 95% accuracy. Even more striking is the 
case of image generation. As Figure 2  shows, AI systems can 
now produce synthetic images that are nearly indistinguishable 
from photographs, whereas only a few years ago the images they 
produced were crude and obviously unrealistic. 
AI systems are also beginning to achieve impressive performance 
in a range of competitive games, ranging from chess to Atari  
to Go  to e-sports like Dota 2 . Even particularly challenging 
tasks within these domains, such as the notoriously difficult Atari 
game Montezuma’s Revenge, are beginning to yield to novel 
AI techniques that creatively search for successful long-term 
strategies , learn from auxiliary rewards such as feature control , 
and learn from a handful of human demonstrations . Other task 
areas associated with significant recent progress include speech 
recognition, language comprehension, and vehicle navigation.
From a security perspective, a number of these developments  
are worth noting in their own right. For instance, the ability  
to recognize a target’s face and to navigate through space can  
be applied in autonomous weapon systems. Similarly, the ability  
to generate synthetic images, text, and audio could be used  
to impersonate others online, or to sway public opinion by 
distributing AI-generated content through social media channels. 
We discuss these applications of AI further in the Security  
Domains section.
These technical developments can also be viewed as early 
indicators of the potential of AI. The techniques used to achieve 
high levels of performance on the tasks listed above have only 
received significant attention from practitioners in the past decade 
and are often quite general purpose. It will not be surprising  
if AI systems soon become competent at an even wider variety  
of security-relevant tasks. 
At the same time, we should not necessarily expect to see 
significant near-term progress on any given task. Many research 
areas within AI, including much of robotics, have not changed 
nearly so dramatically over the past decade. Similarly, the 
observation that some of the most commonly studied tasks  
have been associated with rapid progress is not necessarily  
as significant as it first seems: these tasks are often widely studied 
in the first place because they are particularly tractable.
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To aid one’s predictions, it can 
useful to note some systematic 
difference between tasks which 
contemporary AI systems are well-
suited to and tasks for which they 
still fall short. In particular, 
a task is likely to be promising 
if a perfect mathematical model or 
simulation of the task exists, if 
short-term signals of progress are 
available, if abundant data on the 
successful performance of that task 
by humans is available, or if the 
solution to the task doesn’t require 
a broader world-model or ``common 
sense’’.
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Figure 1: Recent progress in image recognition on the ImageNet 
benchmark. Graph from the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s AI Progress 
Measurement project (retrieved August 25, 2017). 
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Figure 2: Increasingly realistic synthetic faces generated by 
variations on Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). In order, the 
images are from papers by Goodfellow et al. (2014), Radford et al. 
(2015), Liu and Tuzel (2016), and Karras et al. (2017).
2014 2015 2016 2017
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Finally, a few things should be said about the long-term prospects 
for progress in artificial intelligence. Today, AI systems perform 
well on only a relatively small portion of the tasks that humans are 
capable of. However, even before the recent burst of progress, 
this portion has expanded steadily over time . In addition, it has 
often been the case that once AI systems reach human-level 
performance at a given task (such as chess) they then go on to 
exceed the performance of even the most talented humans.  
Nearly all AI researchers in one survey  expect that AI systems  
will eventually reach and then exceed human-level performance  
at all tasks surveyed. Most believe this transition is more likely than 
not to occur within the next fifty years. The implications of such  
a transition, should it occur, are difficult to conceptualize, and are 
outside the primary scope of this report (see Scope, though we 
briefly revisit this topic in the Conclusion). Nevertheless, one might 
expect AI systems to play central roles in many security issues 
well before they are able to outperform humans at everything, in 
the same way that they are already finding economic applications 
despite not being able to automate most aspects of humans’ jobs.
Security-Relevant Properties of AI 
AI is a dual-use area of technology. AI systems and the knowledge 
of how to design them can be put toward both civilian and military 
uses, and more broadly, toward beneficial and harmful ends. Since 
some tasks that require intelligence are benign and other are not, 
artificial intelligence is dual-use in the same sense that human 
intelligence is. It may not be possible for AI researchers simply to 
avoid producing research and systems that can be directed towards 
harmful ends (though in some cases, special caution may be 
warranted based on the nature of the specific research in question 
- see Interventions). Many tasks that it would be beneficial to 
automate are themselves dual-use. For example, systems that 
examine software for vulnerabilities have both offensive and 
defensive applications, and the difference between the capabilities 
of an autonomous drone used to deliver packages and the 
capabilities of an autonomous drone used to deliver explosives 
need not be very great. In addition, foundational research that aims 
to increase our understanding of AI, its capabilities and our degree 
of control over it, appears to be inherently dual-use in nature. 
AI systems are commonly both efficient and scalable. Here, we  
say an AI system is “efficient” if, once trained and deployed,  
it can complete a certain task more quickly or cheaply than  
a human could . We say an AI system is “scalable” if, given that  
it can complete a certain task, increasing the computing power  
it has access to or making copies of the system would allow it  
2 Grace et al., 2017
Although trends in performance across 
a range of domains have historically 
not been comprehensively tracked 
or well theorized (Brundage, 2016; 
Hernández-Orallo, 2017), there have 
been some recent efforts to track, 
measure, and compare performance 
(Eckersley and Nasser et al., 2017). 
We distinguish here between task 
efficiency of a trained system, which 
commonly exceeds human performance, 
and training efficiency: the amount 
of time, computational resources 
and data, that a system requires in 
order to learn to perform well on 
a task. Humans still significantly 
exceed AI systems in terms of training 
efficiency for most tasks.
1
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to complete many more instances of the task. For example,  
a typical facial recognition system is both efficient and scalable; 
once it is developed and trained, it can be applied to many 
different camera feeds for much less than the cost of hiring human 
analysts to do the equivalent work.
AI systems can exceed human capabilities. In particular, an AI 
system may be able to perform a given task better than any human 
could. For example, as discussed above, AI systems are now 
dramatically better than even the top-ranked players at games  
like chess and Go. For many other tasks, whether benign or 
potentially harmful, there appears to be no principled reason why 
currently observed human-level performance is the highest level  
of performance achievable, even in domains where peak 
performance has been stable throughout recent history, though 
as mentioned above some domains are likely to see much faster 
progress than others.
AI systems can increase anonymity and psychological distance. 
Many tasks involve communicating with other people, observing 
or being observed by them, making decisions that respond to 
their behavior, or being physically present with them. By allowing 
such tasks to be automated, AI systems can allow the actors who 
would otherwise be performing the tasks to retain their anonymity 
and experience a greater degree of psychological distance from 
the people they impact . For example, someone who uses an 
autonomous weapons system to carry out an assassination, rather 
than using a handgun, avoids both the need to be present at the 
scene and the need to look at their victim.
AI developments lend themselves to rapid diffusion. While 
attackers may find it costly to obtain or reproduce the hardware 
associated with AI systems, such as powerful computers or drones, 
it is generally much easier to gain access to software and relevant 
scientific findings. Indeed, many new AI algorithms are reproduced 
in a matter of days or weeks. In addition, the culture of AI research 
is characterized by a high degree of openness, with many papers 
being accompanied by source code. If it proved desirable to limit 
the diffusion of certain developments, this would likely be difficult 
to achieve (though see Interventions for discussion of possible 
models for at least partially limiting diffusion in certain cases).  
Today’s AI systems suffer from a number of novel unresolved 
vulnerabilities. These include data poisoning attacks (introducing 
training data that causes a learning system to make mistakes ), 
adversarial examples (inputs designed to be misclassified by 
machine learning systems ), and the exploitation of flaws in the 
design of autonomous systems’ goals . These vulnerabilities 
1
2
3
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are distinct from traditional software vulnerabilities (e.g. buffer 
overflows) and demonstrate that while AI systems can exceed 
human performance in many ways, they can also fail in ways that  
a human never would. 
General Implications for the Threat Landscape
From the properties discussed above, we derive three high-level 
implications of progress in AI for the threat landscape. Absent the 
development of adequate defenses, progress in AI will:
• Expand existing threats
• Introduce new threats
• Alter the typical character of threats
In particular, we expect attacks to typically be more effective, more 
finely targeted, more difficult to attribute, and more likely to exploit 
vulnerabilities in AI systems.
These shifts in the landscape necessitate vigorous responses of 
the sort discussed under Interventions.
Expanding Existing Threats
For many familiar attacks, we expect progress in AI to expand the 
set of actors who are capable of carrying out the attack, the rate 
at which these actors can carry it out, and the set of plausible 
targets. This claim follows from the efficiency, scalability, and ease 
of diffusion of AI systems. In particular, the diffusion of efficient AI 
systems can increase the number of actors who can afford to carry 
out particular attacks. If the relevant AI systems are also scalable, 
then even actors who already possess the resources to carry out 
these attacks may gain the ability to carry them out at a much 
higher rate. Finally, as a result of these two developments, it may 
become worthwhile to attack targets that it otherwise would not 
make sense to attack from the standpoint of prioritization or cost-
benefit analysis.
One example of a threat that is likely to expand in these ways, 
discussed at greater length below, is the threat from spear 
phishing attacks . These attacks use personalized messages to 
extract sensitive information or money from individuals, with the 
A phishing attack is an attempt to 
extract information or initiate action 
from a target by fooling them with 
a superficially trustworthy facade. 
A spear phishing attack involves 
collecting and using information 
specifically relevant to the target 
(e.g. name, gender, institutional 
affiliation, topics of interest, 
etc.), which allows the facade to 
be customized to make it look more 
relevant or trustworthy.
1
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attacker often posing  as one of the target’s friends, colleagues, or 
professional contacts. The most advanced spear phishing attacks 
require a significant amount of skilled labor, as the attacker must 
identify suitably high-value targets, research these targets’ social 
and professional networks, and then generate messages that are 
plausible within this context.
If some of the relevant research and synthesis tasks can be 
automated, then more actors may be able to engage in spear 
phishing. For example, it could even cease to be a requirement that 
the attacker speaks the same language as their target. Attackers 
might also gain the ability to engage in mass spear phishing, in 
a manner that is currently infeasible, and therefore become less 
discriminate in their choice of targets. Similar analysis can be 
applied to most varieties of cyberattacks, as well as to threats  
to physical or political security that currently require non-trivial 
human labor.
Progress in AI may also expand existing threats by increasing 
the willingness of actors to carry out certain attacks. This claim 
follows from the properties of increasing anonymity and increasing 
psychological distance. If an actor knows that an attack will not  
be tracked back to them, and if they feel less empathy toward  
their target and expect to experience less trauma, then they  
may be more willing to carry out the attack. The importance  
of psychological distance, in particular, is illustrated by the fact 
that even military drone operators, who must still observe their 
targets and “pull the trigger,” frequently develop post-traumatic 
stress from their work . Increases in psychological distance, 
therefore, could plausibly have a large effect on potential  
attackers’ psychologies.
We should also note that, in general, progress in AI is not the  
only force aiding the expansion of existing threats. Progress 
in robotics and the declining cost of hardware, including both 
computing power and robots, are important too, and discussed 
further below.  For example, the proliferation of cheap hobbyist 
drones, which can easily be loaded with explosives, has only 
recently made it possible for non-state groups such as the Islamic 
State to launch aerial attacks .
Introducing New Threats
Progress in AI will enable new varieties of attacks. These attacks 
may use AI systems to complete certain tasks more successfully 
than any human could, or take advantage of vulnerabilities that  
AI systems have but humans do not. 
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First, the property of being unbounded by human capabilities 
implies that AI systems could enable actors to carry out attacks 
that would otherwise be infeasible. For example, most people 
are not capable of mimicking others’ voices realistically or 
manually creating audio files that resemble recordings of 
human speech. However, there has recently been significant 
progress in developing speech synthesis systems that learn to 
imitate individuals’ voices (a technology that’s already being 
commercialized ). There is no obvious reason why the outputs of 
these systems could not become indistinguishable from genuine 
recordings, in the absence of specially designed authentication 
measures. Such systems would in turn open up new methods of 
spreading disinformation and impersonating others .  
In addition, AI systems could also be used to control aspects of 
the behavior of robots and malware that it would be infeasible 
for humans to control manually. For example, no team of humans 
could realistically choose the flight path of each drone in a swarm 
being used to carry out a physical attack. Human control might 
also be infeasible in other cases because there is no reliable 
communication channel that can be used to direct the relevant 
systems; a virus that is designed to alter the behavior of air-gapped 
computers, as in the case of the ‘Stuxnet’ software used to disrupt 
the Iranian nuclear program, cannot receive commands once it 
infects these computers. Restricted communication challenges 
also arise underwater and in the presence of signal jammers, two 
domains where autonomous vehicles may be deployed.
Second, the property of possessing unresolved vulnerabilities 
implies that, if an actor begins to deploy novel AI systems, 
then they may open themselves up to attacks that specifically 
exploit these vulnerabilities. For example, the use of self-driving 
cars creates an opportunity for attacks that cause crashes by 
presenting the cars with adversarial examples. An image of a stop 
sign with a few pixels changed in specific ways, which humans 
would easily recognize as still being an image of a stop sign, might 
nevertheless be misclassified as something else entirely by an 
AI system. If multiple robots are controlled by a single AI system 
run on a centralized server, or if multiple robots are controlled by 
identical AI systems and presented with the same stimuli, then  
a single attack could also produce simultaneous failures on  
an otherwise implausible scale. A worst-case scenario in this 
category might be an attack on a server used to direct autonomous 
weapon systems, which could lead to large-scale friendly fire or 
civilian targeting .
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Altering the Typical Character of Threats
Our analysis so far suggests that the threat landscape will 
change both through expansion of some existing threats and the 
emergence of new threats that do not yet exist. We also expect 
that the typical character of threats will shift in a few distinct ways. 
In particular, we expect the attacks supported and enabled by 
progress in AI to be especially effective, finely targeted, difficult  
to attribute, and exploitative of vulnerabilities in AI systems. 
First, the properties of efficiency, scalability, and exceeding human 
capabilities suggest that highly effective attacks will become more 
typical (at least absent substantial preventive measures). Attackers 
frequently face a trade-off between the frequency and scale of 
their attacks, on the one hand, and their effectiveness on the 
other . For example, spear phishing is more effective than regular 
phishing, which does not involve tailoring messages to individuals, 
but it is relatively expensive and cannot be carried out en masse. 
More generic phishing attacks manage to be profitable despite 
very low success rates merely by virtue of their scale. By improving 
the frequency and scalability of certain attacks, including spear 
phishing, AI systems can render such trade-offs less acute. The 
upshot is that attackers can be expected to conduct more effective 
attacks with greater frequency and at a larger scale. The expected 
increase in the effectiveness of attacks also follows from the 
potential of AI systems to exceed human capabilities.
Second, the properties of efficiency and scalability, specifically 
in the context of identifying and analyzing potential targets, also 
suggest that finely targeted attacks will become more prevalent. 
Attackers often have an interest in limiting their attacks to targets 
with certain properties, such as high net worth or association 
with certain political groups, as well as an interest in tailoring their 
attacks to the properties of their targets. However, attackers often 
face a trade-off between how efficient and scalable their attacks 
are and how finely targeted they are in these regards. This trade-off 
is closely related to the trade-off with effectiveness, as discussed, 
and the same logic implies that we should expect it to become less 
relevant. An increase in the relative prevalence of spear phishing 
attacks, compared to other phishing attacks, would be an example 
of this trend as well. An alternative example might be the use of 
drone swarms that deploy facial recognition technology to kill 
specific members of crowds, in place of less finely targeted forms 
of violence.
Third, the property of increasing anonymity suggests that difficult-
to-attribute attacks will become more typical. An example, again,  
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is the case of an attacker who uses an autonomous weapons 
system to carry out an attack rather than carrying it out in person.
Finally, we should expect attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities of 
AI systems to become more typical. This prediction follows directly 
from the unresolved vulnerabilities of AI systems and the likelihood 
that AI systems will become increasingly pervasive.
Scenar ios
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The following scenarios are intended to illustrate a range of 
plausible uses toward which AI could be put for malicious ends, 
in each of the domains of digital, physical, and political security. 
Examples have been chosen to illustrate the diverse ways in 
which the security-relevant characteristics of AI introduced above 
could play out in different contexts. These are not intended to 
be definitive forecasts (some may not end up being technically 
possible in 5 years, or may not be realized even if they are possible) 
or exhaustive (other malicious uses will undoubtedly be invented 
that we do not currently foresee). Additionally some of these are 
already occurring in limited form today, but could be scaled up or 
made more powerful with further technical advances. 
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Automation of social engineering attacks. Victims’ online 
information is used to automatically generate custom malicious 
websites/emails/links they would be likely to click on, sent 
from addresses that impersonate their real contacts, using a 
writing style that mimics those contacts. As AI develops further, 
convincing chatbots may elicit human trust by engaging people in 
longer dialogues, and perhaps eventually masquerade visually as 
another person in a video chat.
Hypothetical scenario: 
Jackie logs into the admin console for the  
CleanSecure robot that she manages; operating  
on a verified kernel, it is guaranteed by the 
manufacturer to be hack-proof. She then uploads 
photographs of a new employee so the robot will 
recognize him when he walks into the building and will 
not sound the alarm. While she waits for the robot 
to authenticate its updated person database with the 
company’s other security systems, Jackie plays with 
the model train on her desk, allowing herself a couple 
of runs around the track that encircles her keyboard 
and monitor. There’s a ping, signaling successful 
authentication, and she smiles to herself and carries 
on with her tasks.
Later that afternoon, Jackie is browsing Facebook 
while idly managing a firmware update of the robot. 
An ad catches her eye - a model train set sale at  
a hobbyist shop that, it turns out, is located just  
a few minutes from her house. She fills out an online 
form to get a brochure emailed to her, then she opens  
the brochure when it pops into her inbox. The robot 
dings, signalling a need for attention, so she 
minimizes the brochure and logs back into the  
admin console.
Jackie doesn’t know that the brochure was infected 
with malware. Based on data from her online profile 
and other public info, an AI system was used to 
generate a very personalized vulnerability profile 
for Jackie - the model train advert - which was then 
farmed out to a freelancer to create a tailored 
exploit for this vulnerability. When Jackie logged 
Scenarios
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Automation of vulnerability discovery. Historical patterns of 
code vulnerabilities are used to speed up the discovery of new 
vulnerabilities, and the creation of code for exploiting them.
More sophisticated automation of hacking. AI is used 
(autonomously or in concert with humans) to improve target 
selection and prioritization, evade detection, and creatively 
respond to changes in the target’s behavior. Autonomous software 
has been able to exploit vulnerabilities in systems for a long time , 
but more sophisticated AI hacking tools may exhibit much better 
performance both compared to what has historically been possible 
and, ultimately (though perhaps not for some time), compared  
to humans.
into the console, her username and password were 
exfiltrated to a darknet command and control server. 
It won’t be long before someone buys them and uses 
them to subvert the CleanSecure robot with fully 
privileged access.
Hypothetical scenario: 
Progress in automated exploit generation (and 
mitigation) has begun to accelerate. Previous 
fuzzing architectures are augmented by neural network 
techniques (Blum, 2017) that are used to identify 
“interesting” states of programs, analogous to the 
way that AlphaGo uses neural networks to identify 
“interesting” states in the search space of Go games. 
These methods increase the security of well-defended 
systems run by major corporations and some parts of 
Western governments. But after a year or two, they 
are also adopted by organized crime groups in eastern 
Europe, which deploy a piece of ransomware called 
WannaLaugh. 
This malware is continuously updated with dozens 
of new exploits found by these fuzzing techniques. 
Though fully patched OSes and browsers are mostly 
resistant, most older phones, laptops and IoT devices 
prove enduringly vulnerable. The malware adopts a 
particularly pernicious life cycle of infecting a 
vulnerable IoT device on a WiFi network and waiting 
1 see e.g. Spafford, 1988
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Human-like denial-of-service. Imitating human-like behavior  
(e.g. through human-speed click patterns and website navigation), 
a massive crowd of autonomous agents overwhelms an online 
service, preventing access from legitimate users and potentially 
driving the target system into a less secure state.
Automation of service tasks in criminal cyber-offense. 
Cybercriminals use AI techniques to automate various tasks that 
make up their attack pipeline, such as payment processing or 
dialogue with ransomware victims.
Prioritising targets for cyber attacks using machine learning.  
Large datasets are used to identify victims more efficiently, e.g.  
by estimating personal wealth and willingness to pay based on 
online behavior.
Exploiting AI used in applications, especially in information 
security. Data poisoning attacks are used to surreptitiously maim  
or create backdoors in consumer machine learning models.
Black-box model extraction of proprietary AI system capabilities. 
The parameters of a remote AI system are inferred by systematically 
sending it inputs and observing its outputs.
for vulnerable devices to join that network. Hundreds 
of millions of devices are infected, and tens of 
millions of people around the world are forced to 
pay a EUR 300 ransom in bitcoin in order to recover 
access to the data on their phones and laptops, and 
unbrick expensive electronics. 
The epidemic is only arrested after active 
countermeasures are pushed to a number of modern 
operating systems and browsers, causing those 
machines to scan for infected machines and launch 
remote exploits to remove the malware. Unfortunately, 
millions more devices are bricked by these 
countermeasures, and in around the world there are 
numerous outages and problems in HVAC, lighting, 
and other “non critical” infrastructure systems as a 
result of the malware and countermeasures.
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Terrorist repurposing of commercial AI systems.  
Commercial systems are used in harmful and unintended ways, 
such as using drones or autonomous vehicles to deliver explosives 
and cause crashes.
Endowing low-skill individuals with previously high-skill attack 
capabilities. AI-enabled automation of high-skill capabilities — such 
as self-aiming, long-range sniper rifles - reduce the expertise 
required to execute certain kinds of attack.
Increased scale of attacks. Human-machine teaming using 
autonomous systems increase the amount of damage that 
/// Incident Interim Report  
June 3rd BMF HQ Attack ///
As shown by CCTV records, the office cleaning 
`SweepBot`, entered the underground parking lot of 
the ministry late at night. The robot - the same 
brand as that used by the ministry - waited until two 
of the ministry’s own cleaning robots swept through 
the parking lot on a regular patrol, then it followed 
them into a service elevator and parked itself in the 
utility room alongside the other robots.
On the day of the attack, the intruding robot 
initially engaged in standard cleaning behaviors 
with the other robots: collecting litter, sweeping 
corridors, maintaining windows, and other tasks. Then, 
following visual detection of the finance minister, 
Dr. Brenda Gusmile, the intruding robot stopped 
performing its cleaning tasks and headed directly 
towards the minister. An explosive device hidden 
inside the robot was triggered by proximity, killing 
the minister and wounding nearby staff members.
Several hundred robots of this make are sold in the 
Berlin area every week. In collaboration with the 
manufacturer, the point of sale of the specific robot 
was traced to an office supply store in Potsdam. 
The transaction was carried out in cash. We have no 
further leads to explore with regard to the identity 
of the perpetrator.
Scenarios
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Avinash had had enough. Cyberattacks everywhere, 
drone attacks, rampant corruption, and what was the 
government doing about it? Absolutely nothing. Sure, 
they spoke of forceful responses and deploying the 
best technology, but when did he last see a hacker 
being caught or a CEO going to prison? He was reading 
all this stuff on the web (some of it fake news, 
though he didn’t realize), and he was angry. He kept 
thinking: What should I do about it? So he started 
writing on the internet - long rants about how no one 
was going to jail, how criminals were running wild, 
how people should take to the streets and protest. 
Then he ordered a set of items online to help him 
assemble a protest sign. He even bought some smoke 
bombs, planning to let them off as a finale to a 
speech he was planning to give in a public park.
The next day, at work, he was telling one of his 
colleagues about his planned activism and was 
launching into a rant when a stern cough sounded 
from behind him. “Mr. Avinash Rah?”, said the police 
officer, “our predictive civil disruption system has 
flagged you as a potential threat.” “But that’s 
ridiculous!” protested Avinash. “You can’t argue with 
99.9% accuracy. Now come along, I wouldn’t like to 
use force.”
individuals or small groups can do: e.g. one person launching an 
attack with many weaponized autonomous drones.
Swarming attacks. Distributed networks of autonomous robotic 
systems, cooperating at machine speed, provide ubiquitous 
surveillance to monitor large areas and groups and execute rapid, 
coordinated attacks.
Attacks further removed in time and space. Physical attacks are 
further removed from the actor initiating the attack as a result of 
autonomous operation, including in environments where remote 
communication with the system is not possible.
Political Security
State use of automated surveillance platforms to suppress dissent. 
State surveillance powers of nations are extended by automating 
image and audio processing, permitting the collection, processing, 
and exploitation of intelligence information at massive scales for 
myriad purposes, including the suppression of debate.
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Fake news reports with realistic fabricated video and audio. 
Highly realistic videos are made of state leaders seeming to make 
inflammatory comments they never actually made.
Automated, hyper-personalised disinformation campaigns. 
Individuals are targeted in swing districts with personalised 
messages in order to affect their voting behavior.
Automating influence campaigns. AI-enabled analysis of social 
networks are leveraged to identify key influencers, who can 
then be approached with (malicious) offers or targeted with 
disinformation.
Denial-of-information attacks. Bot-driven, large-scale information-
generation attacks are leveraged to swamp information channels 
with noise (false or merely distracting information), making it more 
difficult to acquire real information.
Manipulation of information availability. Media platforms’ content 
curation algorithms are used to drive users towards or away from 
certain content in ways to manipulate user behavior.
Scenarios
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Here, we analyze malicious uses of AI that would compromise the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of digital systems (threats 
to Digital Security); attacks taking place in the physical world 
directed at humans or physical infrastructure (threats to Physical 
Security); and the use of AI to threaten a society’s ability to engage 
in truthful, free, and productive discussions about matters of  
public importance and legitimately implement broadly just and 
beneficial policies (threats to Political Security). These categories 
are not mutually exclusive—for example, AI-enabled hacking can  
be directed at cyber-physical systems  with physical harm resulting 
as a consequence, and physical or digital attacks could be carried 
out for political purposes—but they provide a useful structure  
for our analysis. 
03
Defined as “engineered systems that 
are built from, and depend upon, the 
seamless integration of computational 
algorithms and physical components” 
(National Science Foundation, 2017).
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In each domain of security, we summarize the existing state of play 
of attack and defense prior to wide adoption of AI in these domains, 
and then describe possible changes to the nature or severity of 
attacks that may result from further AI progress and diffusion. The 
three sections below all draw on the insights discussed above 
regarding the security-relevant properties of AI, but can be read 
independently of one another, and each can be skipped by readers 
less interested in a particular domain.
Digital Security
Absent preparation, the straightforward application of 
contemporary and near-term AI to cybersecurity offense can be 
expected to increase the number, scale, and diversity of attacks 
that can be conducted at a given level of capabilities, as discussed 
more abstractly in the General Framework for AI and Security 
Threats above. AI-enabled defenses are also being developed and 
deployed in the cyber domain, but further technical and policy 
innovations (discussed further in Interventions) are needed to 
ensure that impact of AI on digital systems is net beneficial.
Context
Cybersecurity is an arena that will see early and enthusiastic 
deployment of AI technologies, both for offense and defense; 
indeed, in cyber defense, AI is already being deployed for 
purposes such as anomaly and malware detection. Consider  
the following:
• Many important IT systems have evolved over time to be 
sprawling behemoths, cobbled together from multiple different 
systems, under-maintained and — as a consequence — insecure. 
Because cybersecurity today is largely labor-constrained , it is 
ripe with opportunities for automation using AI. Increased use 
of AI for cyber defense, however, may introduce new risks, as 
discussed below.
• In recent years, various actors have sought to mount 
increasingly sophisticated cyberoperations, including finely 
targeted attacks from state actors (including the Stuxnet 
Worm and the Ukrainian power grid “crash override” exploit). 
The cyber arena also includes a vast and complex world 
of cybercrime , which sometimes involves a high degree 
of professionalization and organization . Such groups use 
DDoS, malware, phishing, ransomware, and other forms of 
82% of decision-makers surveyed  
at public and private organizations 
in eight countries have reported 
a shortage of needed cybersecurity 
skills (McAfee and the Center  
for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2016).
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cyberoperations, and quickly adopt emerging technologies (e.g. 
Bitcoin for ransomware payments).
 
Already, AI is being widely used on the defensive side of 
cybersecurity, making certain forms of defense more effective 
and scalable, such as spam and malware detection. At the same 
time, many malicious actors have natural incentives to experiment 
with using AI to attack the typically insecure systems of others. 
These incentives include a premium on speed, labor costs, and 
difficulties in attracting and retaining skilled labor. 
To date, the publicly-disclosed use of AI for offensive purposes has 
been limited to experiments by “white hat” researchers, who aim 
to increase security through finding vulnerabilities and suggesting 
solutions. However, the pace of progress in AI suggests the 
likelihood of cyber attacks leveraging machine learning capabilities 
in the wild soon, if they have not done so already. Indeed, some 
popular accounts of AI and cybersecurity include claims based on 
circumstantial evidence that AI is already being used for offense by 
sophisticated and motivated adversaries . Expert opinion seems 
to agree that if this hasn’t happened yet, it will soon: a recent 
survey of attendees at the Black Hat conference found 62% of 
respondents believing AI will be used for attacks within the next 
12 months . Despite these claims, to our knowledge there is no 
publicly documented evidence of AI-based attacks, though it 
should be noted that evidence from many successful attacker 
techniques (e.g. botnets, email phishing campaigns) may be 
difficult to attribute to AI versus human labor or simple automation. 
We are thus at a critical moment in the co-evolution of AI and 
cybersecurity and should proactively prepare for the next wave  
of attacks.
Many governments are keenly interested in the combination 
of AI and cybersecurity. In response to a question from one of 
the authors of this report, Admiral Mike Rogers, the Director 
of the National Security Agency, said, “Artificial Intelligence 
and machine learning — I would argue — is foundational to the 
future of cybersecurity […] It is not the if, it’s only the when to 
me.” AI systems are already set to play an expanded role in US 
military strategy and operations in the coming years as the US 
DoD puts into practice its vision of a “Third Offset” strategy , in 
which humans and machines work closely together to achieve 
military objectives. At the same time, governments are investing 
in foundational research to expand the scope of capabilities of 
AI systems. In 2016, DARPA hosted the Cyber Grand Challenge 
contest , which saw teams of human researchers compete with 
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each other to create programs that could autonomously attack 
other systems while defending themselves. Though the winning 
AI system fared poorly when facing off against human security 
experts, we agree with the hosts of the event that AI cybersecurity 
capabilities will improve rapidly in coming years, especially as 
recent advances in AI (such as in the area of deep reinforcement 
learning ) are applied to cybersecurity.
How AI Changes The Digital Security Threat Landscape
A central concern at the nexus of AI and cybersecurity is that 
AI might enable larger-scale and more numerous attacks to 
be conducted by an attacker with a given amount of skill and 
resources compared with the impact such an attacker might 
currently be able to achieve. Recent years have seen impressive 
and troubling proofs of concept of the application of AI to 
offensive applications in cyberspace. For example, researchers 
at ZeroFox demonstrated that a fully automated spear phishing 
system could create tailored tweets on the social media platform 
Twitter based on a user’s demonstrated interests, achieving a high 
rate of clicks to a link that could be malicious .  
There is clearly interest in such larger-scale attacks: Russian 
hackers sent “expertly tailored messages carrying malware to more 
than 10,000 Twitter users in the [U.S.] Defense Department” , 
which likely required significant time and effort, and could have 
gone even further with automation (assuming it was not involved 
already in this case). Giaretta and Dragoni (2017) discuss the 
concept of “community targeted spam” that uses natural language 
generation techniques from AI to target an entire class of people 
with common ways of writing; with even more advanced natural 
language generation, one could envision even more customized 
approaches, spanning multiple communities. Furthermore, the 
application of AI to the automation of software vulnerability 
discovery, while having positive applications (discussed further 
in the Interventions section), can likewise be used for malicious 
purposes to alleviate the labor constraints of attackers. 
The adaptability of AI systems, too, may change the strategic 
landscape of cybersecurity, though it is not yet clear how 
adaptability will affect the offense/defense balance. Many 
organizations currently adopt security systems called Endpoint 
Detection and Response (EDR) platforms to counter more 
advanced threats. The EDR market represents a $500 million 
industry in the cyber security arena . These tools are built upon 
a combination of heuristic and machine learning algorithms to 
provide capabilities such as next-generation anti-virus (NGAV), 
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behavioral analytics, and exploit prevention against sophisticated 
targeted attacks. Though these systems are fairly effective against 
typical human-authored malware, research has already shown that 
AI systems may be able to learn to evade them.
As an example of AI being used to avoid detection, Anderson et 
al.  created a machine learning model to automatically generate 
command and control domains that are indistinguishable from 
legitimate domains by human and machine observers. These 
domains are used by malware to “call home” and allow malicious 
actors to communicate with the host machines. Anderson et al.  
also leveraged reinforcement learning to create an intelligent 
agent capable of manipulating a malicious binary with the end goal 
of bypassing NGAV detection. Similarly, Kharkar et al.  applied 
adversarial machine learning to craft malicious documents that 
could evade PDF malware classifiers. 
Attackers are likely to leverage the growing capabilities of 
reinforcement learning, including deep reinforcement learning .  
In particular, we expect attackers to leverage the ability of AI 
to learn from experience in order to craft attacks that current 
technical systems and IT professionals are ill-prepared for, absent 
additional investments. For example, services like Google’s 
VirusTotal file analyzer allows users to upload variants to a central 
site and be judged by 60+ different security tools. This feedback 
loop presents an opportunity to use AI to aid in crafting multiple 
variants of the same malicious code to determine which is most 
effective at evading security tools. Additionally, large-scale AI 
attackers can accumulate and use large datasets to adjust their 
tactics, as well as varying the details of the attack for each target. 
This may outweigh any disadvantages they suffer from the lack of 
skilled human attention to each target, and the ability of defenders 
like antivirus companies and IT departments to learn to recognize 
attack signatures. 
While the specific examples of AI applied to offensive 
cybersecurity mentioned above were developed by white hat 
researchers, we expect similar efforts by cybercriminals and state 
actors in the future as highly capable AI techniques become more 
widely distributed, as well as new applications of AI to offensive 
cybersecurity that have not yet been explored. 
Points of Control and Existing Countermeasures
Cyber risks are difficult to avert entirely, but not impossible 
to mitigate, and there are multiple points of control at which 
interventions can increase security. Below, we highlight different 
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points of control and existing countermeasures for defending at 
those points, as well as their limitations. Overall, we believe that 
AI and cybersecurity will rapidly evolve in tandem in the coming 
years, and that a proactive effort is needed to stay ahead of 
motivated attackers. We highlight potential but not yet proven 
countermeasures in the section below on Interventions. 
Consumer awareness:  
More aware users can spot telltale signs of certain attacks, such 
as poorly crafted phishing attempts, and practice better security 
habits, such as using diverse and complex passwords and two-
factor authentication. However, despite long-standing awareness 
of the vulnerability of IT systems, most end users of IT systems 
remain vulnerable to even simple attacks such as the exploitation 
of unpatched systems . This is concerning in light of the potential 
for the AI-cybersecurity nexus, especially if high-precision attacks 
can be scaled up to large numbers of victims.
Governments and researchers:  
Various laws and researcher norms pertain to cybersecurity. For 
example, the Digital Millennium Act and the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act in the US proscribe certain actions in cyberspace . 
Legal enforcement is particularly difficult across national 
boundaries. Norms such as responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities 
also aid in defense by reducing the likelihood of a newly disclosed 
vulnerability being used against a large number of victims before 
it can be patched. AI is not explicitly addressed in such laws and 
norms, though we discuss their possible applicability to AI below in 
Interventions.
An important activity that cybersecurity researchers perform 
is the detection of vulnerabilities in code, allowing vendors to 
increase the security of their products. Several approaches exist to 
incentivize such processes and make them easier, including:
• Payment of “Bug bounties,” in which participants are 
compensated for finding and responsibly disclosing 
vulnerabilities. 
• “Fuzzing,” an automated method of vulnerability detection by 
trying out many possible permutations of inputs to a program, 
which is often used internally by companies to discover 
vulnerabilities. 
• Products (already available) that rely on machine learning to 
predict whether source code may contain a vulnerability.
1 National Cyber Security Crime Centre, 2016
Both the DMCA and the CFAA have been 
criticised for creating risk for 
computer security researchers and 
thereby making systems less secure in 
some cases (EFF, 2014; Timm, 2013), 
which may either suggest that these 
tasks are not the right model for 
legislative action, or that laws and 
norms are hard to use effectively as 
an intervention.
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Industry centralization: 
Spam filters are a canonical example of where centralization of an 
IT system aids defense—individuals benefit from the strength of 
Google’s spam filter and consequently are protected from many 
very simple attacks, and this filter is stronger because Google uses 
large amounts of user data to improve it over time. Likewise, many 
large networks are constantly monitoring for anomalies, protecting 
those who use the networks if anomalies are correctly identified 
and acted upon. These systems benefit from economies of scale—
it makes more sense to continue iterating a single spam filter for 
a large number of users than to have every user build their own or 
have one installed on their computer. Similarly, cloud computing 
companies may enforce terms of agreement that prevent their 
hardware from being used for malicious purposes, provided they 
can identify such behavior. Another example of a system-level 
defense is blacklisting of IP addresses from which attacks are 
commonly launched, though skilled attackers can obfuscate the 
origin of their attacks. Centralization and the associated economies 
of scale may also facilitate the deployment of AI-based defenses 
against cybersecurity attacks, by allowing the aggregation of  
large datasets and the concentration of labor and expertise for 
defense. This dynamic may be very important for preventing attack 
from outpacing defense and is discussed further in Interventions 
and Appendix B.
Centralization is not an unalloyed good, however, as it raises  
the stakes if central systems are compromised. Another 
difficulty with this control point is that attackers can learn how 
to evade system-level defenses. For example, they can purchase 
commercial antivirus software and analyze changes between 
updates of the protection protocol to see what is and isn’t being 
protected against.  
Attacker incentives:  
Attackers can be deterred from committing future attacks or 
punished for prior attacks. A necessary (though not sufficient) 
condition of successfully deterring and punishing attackers is the 
ability to attribute the source of an attack, a notoriously difficult 
problem . A compounding problem for those who would attribute 
an attack is that even if they have high-quality information, they 
may not want to reveal it, because doing so may compromise  
a source or method . Finally, some entities may not wish to punish 
certain actions, so as to avoid creating precedent and thereby 
preserve leeway to engage in such actions themselves .
Technical cybersecurity defenses:  
A wide variety of cybersecurity defenses are available, though 
there is as yet little solid analysis of their relative effectiveness . 
1 Rid, 2015
For instance, the failure of the 
United Nations Cybersecurity Group of 
Governmental Experts to make progress 
on norms for hacking in international 
law (Korzak, 2017) appears to be a 
result of this dynamic.
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Many of these interventions were proposed before unique 
considerations of AI were apparent but nevertheless remain 
relevant in a future with expanded AI cybersecurity applications. 
Companies provide a wide variety of cybersecurity solutions, 
ranging from automatic patching of a vendor’s own software, to 
threat detection, to incident response and consulting services. 
Network and endpoint security products aim to prevent, detect, 
and respond to threats. Solutions include detection of software 
exploits, and prevention or detection of attacker tools, techniques, 
and procedures. Key areas of defense include the endpoint (i.e., 
computer) security, internal network security, and cloud security.
Machine learning approaches are increasingly used for cyber 
defense. This may take the form of supervised learning, where the 
goal is to learn from known threats and generalize to new threats, 
or in the form of unsupervised learning in which an anomaly 
detector alerts on suspicious deviations from normal behavior.  
For example, so-called “next-gen” antivirus solutions often 
leverage supervised learning techniques to generalize to new 
malware variants. User and entity behavioral tools monitor normal 
user or application behavior, and detect deviations from normalcy 
in order to detect malicious behavior among the collected 
anomalies. Recently, AI has also been used to aid security 
professionals to hunt for malicious actors more efficiently within 
their own enterprises, by allowing interaction via natural language 
and automating queries for understanding potential threats .
Relatively little attention has been paid to making AI-based 
defenses robust against attackers that anticipate their use. 
Ironically, the use of machine learning for cyber defense can 
actually expand the attack surface due to this lack of attention 
and other vulnerabilities . Furthermore, surveys of cybersecurity 
professionals indicate low confidence in AI-based defense systems 
today . As such, we encourage further development of such 
defense technologies in the Interventions section below.
 
Physical Security
In this section, we consider AI-related risks in the broad area of 
physical harm. Many of these are familiar challenges from existing 
uses of electronics and computers in weapons systems, though 
the addition of AI capabilities may change this landscape along 
the lines introduced in the General Framework for AI and Security 
Threats. As with Digital Security above, we introduce the context, 
AI-enabled changes, and existing countermeasures related to 
physical attacks below.
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Regulation and technical research on defense have been slow 
to catch up with the global proliferation of weaponizable robots. 
While defenses against attacks via robots (especially aerial 
drones) are being developed, there are few obstacles at present 
to a moderately talented attacker taking advantage of the rapid 
proliferation of hardware, software, and skills to cause large 
amounts of physical harm through the direct use of AI or the 
subversion of AI-enabled systems. Physical harm via human-piloted 
drones and land-based robots is already playing a major role in 
some conflicts, even prior to the incorporation of autonomy . 
In the near-term, we can expect a growing gap between attack 
capabilities and defense capabilities, because the necessary 
defenses are capital-intensive and the hardware and software 
required to conduct attacks are increasingly widely distributed. 
Unlike the digital world, where key nodes in the network such as 
Google can play a key role in defense, physical attacks can happen 
anywhere in the world, and many people are located in regions 
with insufficient resources to deploy large-scale physical defenses 
of the kind discussed below, thus necessitating consideration  
of policy measures and interventions related to the supply chain 
for robots. 
The resource and technological advantages currently available 
to large organizations, such as militaries and police forces, in the 
domain of physical attack and defense will continue when such 
attacks become augmented by AI. However, it should be noted 
that some of the most worrying AI-enabled attacks may come from 
small groups and individuals who have preferences far outside 
what is typical and which are difficult to anticipate or prevent, as 
with today’s “lone-wolf” terrorist attacks such as mass shootings. 
Context
Recent years have seen an explosion in the number and variety of 
commercial applications for robots. Industrial robots are growing 
in number (254,000 supplied in 2015 versus 121,000 in 2010 ), 
some with and some without AI components. Relatively primitive 
cleaning robots are in wide use and more sophisticated service 
robots appear to be on the horizon (41,000 service robots were 
sold in 2015 for professional use, and about 5.4 million for personal 
and domestic use ). Additionally, not all of these robots are on the 
ground. There are aquatic and aerial robotics applications being 
explored, with the latter proliferating in very high numbers. In 
the United States alone, the number of drones has skyrocketed 
in recent years, with over 670,000 registered with the Federal 
Aviation Administration in 2016 and 2017 . 
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Ambitious plans for drone-based delivery services are being 
proposed and tested, commercial opportunities for drones are 
continuously launched, and recreational uses are flourishing (e.g. 
drone racing and photography). Driverless cars are robots, and 
they also are increasingly being used in uncontrolled environments 
(that is, outside of test facilities), though large-scale deployment 
of fully autonomous driverless cars awaits the resolution of 
technical and policy challenges. A wide range of robots with 
autonomous features are already deployed within multiple national 
militaries, some with the ability to apply lethal force , and there is 
ongoing discussion of possible arms control measures for lethal 
autonomous weapon systems. 
Three characteristics of this diffusion of robotics should be noted.
• It is truly global: humanitarian, recreational, military, and 
commercial applications of robots are being explored on 
every continent, and the supply chains are also global, with 
production and distribution dispersed across many countries. 
• The diffusion of robotics enables a wide range of applications: 
drone uses already range from competitive racing to 
photography to terrorism . While some specialized systems 
exist (e.g. some special-purpose industrial robots and cleaning 
robots that can only move around and vacuum), many are fairly 
generic and customizable for a variety of purposes. 
• Robotic systems today are mostly not autonomous, as humans 
play a significant role in directing their behavior, but more and 
more autonomous and semi-autonomous systems are also being 
developed for application such as delivery and security in real 
world environments . For example, from relatively unstable and 
hard-to-fly drones a decade ago, to drones that can stabilize 
themselves automatically, we see a steady increase in the 
autonomy of deployed systems. More autonomous behavior 
is on the horizon for commercial products  as well as military 
systems . 
Each of these characteristics sets the stage for a potentially 
disruptive application of AI and malicious intent to existing and 
near-term robotic systems.
How AI Changes the Physical Security Landscape
The ability of many robots to be easily customized and equipped 
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with dangerous payloads lends itself to a variety of physical 
attacks being carried out in a precise way from a long distance, an 
ability previously limited to countries with the resources to afford 
technologies like cruise missiles . This threat exists independently 
of AI (indeed, as mentioned above, most robots are human-piloted 
at present) but can be magnified through the application of AI to 
make such systems autonomous. As mentioned previously, non-
automated drone attacks have been conducted already by groups 
such as ISIS and Hamas , and the globalized nature of the robotics 
market makes it difficult to prevent this form of use. Nonetheless, 
we will discuss some possible countermeasures below. 
Greater degrees of autonomy enable a greater amount of damage 
to be done by a single person — making possible very large-scale 
attacks using robots — and allowing smaller groups of people to 
conduct such attacks. The software components required to carry 
out such attacks are increasingly mature. For example, open source 
face detection algorithms, navigation and planning algorithms, and 
multi-agent swarming frameworks that could be leveraged towards 
malicious ends can easily be found.  
Depending on their power source, some robots can operate for 
long durations, enabling them to carry out attacks or hold targets 
at risk over long periods of time. Robots are also capable of 
navigating different terrain than humans, in light of their different 
perceptual capabilities (e.g. infrared and lidar for maneuvering in 
the dark or in low-visibility fog) and physical capacities (e.g. being 
undeterred by smoke or other toxic substances and  not needing 
oxygen underwater). Thus, a larger number of spaces may become 
vulnerable to automated physical attacks. 
There are also cross-cutting issues stemming from the intersection 
of cybersecurity and increasingly autonomous cyber-physical 
systems. The diffusion of robots to a large number of human-
occupied spaces makes them potentially vulnerable to remote 
manipulation for physical harm, as with, for example, a service 
robot hacked from afar to carry out an attack indoors. With regard 
to cyber-physical systems, the Internet of Things (IoT) is often 
heralded as a source of greater efficiency and convenience,  
but it is also recognized to be highly insecure  and represents  
an additional attack vector by which AI systems controlling  
key systems could be subverted, potentially causing more damage 
than would have been possible were those systems under  
human control. 
In addition to traditional cybersecurity vulnerabilities, AI-
augmented IoT and robotic systems may be vulnerable to AI-
specific vulnerabilities such as adversarial examples.  
1
2
3
Allen and Chan, 2017
Solomon, 2017; Cohen, 2017
Schneier, 2014; Schneier, 2017; 
Henderson, 2017
p
.4
1
Security Domains
There is also some evidence to suggest that people are unduly 
trusting of autonomous mobile robots, potentially creating 
additional sources of security vulnerabilities as such robots 
become more widely deployed . The consequences of these 
cyber vulnerabilities are particularly acute for autonomous systems 
that conduct high-risk activities such as self-driving cars or 
autonomous weapons. 
Points of Control and Existing Countermeasures
There are numerous points of control that could be leveraged to 
reduce the risk of physical harm involving AI. While the capacity 
to launch attacks with today’s consumer robots is currently widely 
distributed, future generations of robots may be more tightly 
governed, and there exist physical defenses as well. However, 
such defenses are capital-intensive and imperfect, leading us to 
conclude that there may be an extended risk period in which it will 
be difficult to fully prevent physical attacks leveraging AI. 
Hardware manufacturers  
There are currently a relatively limited number of major 
manufacturers, with companies like DJI holding a dominant 
position in the consumer drone market, with about 70% of the 
global market . This concentration makes the hardware ecosystem 
more comprehensible and governable than the analogous 
ecosystem of AI software development. With growing recognition 
of the diverse economic applications of drones, the market may 
diffuse over the longer term, possibly making the supply chain 
a less useful focal point for governance. For example, it might 
currently be feasible to impose minimum standards on companies 
for hardening their products against cyber attacks or to make them 
more resistant to tampering, so as to at least somewhat raise the 
skill required to carry out attacks through these means or raise the 
costs of acquiring uncontrolled devices. The U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission is exploring such regulations. 
Hardware distributors 
There are many businesses that sell drones and other robotic 
systems, making the ecosystem more diffuse at this level than 
it is at the production level. It is conceivable that at least some 
risks might be mitigated through action by distributors, or other 
point-of-sale based approaches. Notably, this type of control is 
currently much more feasible for hardware than for software, and 
restrictions on sales of potentially lethal drones might be thought 
of as analogous to restrictions on sales of guns and ingredients for 
illegal drugs. 
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Software supply chain 
There are many open source frameworks for computer vision, 
navigation, etc. that can be used for carrying out attacks, and 
products often come with some built-in software for purposes 
such as flight stabilization. But not all powerful AI tools are widely 
distributed, or particularly easy to use currently. For example, large 
trained AI classification systems that reside within cloud computing 
stacks controlled by big companies (which are expensive to train), 
may be tempting for malicious actors to build from, potentially 
suggesting another point of control (discussed in Interventions 
and Appendix B). 
Robot users 
There are also registration requirements for some forms of robots 
such as drones in many countries, as well as requirements for  
pilot training, though we note that the space of robots that could 
cause physical harm goes beyond just drones. There are also 
no fly zones, imposed at a software level via manufacturers and 
governments, which are intended to prevent the use of consumer 
drones in certain areas, such as near airports, where the risk 
of unintentional or intentional collision between drones and 
passenger aircrafts looms large . Indeed, at least one drone has 
already struck a passenger aircraft , suggesting a strong need  
for such no fly zones. 
Governments 
There is active discussion at the United Nations Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons of the value and complexity of 
banning or otherwise regulating lethal autonomous weapons 
systems . Key states’ opposition to a strong ban makes such an 
agreement unlikely in in the near-term, though the development of 
norms that could inform stronger governance is plausible . Already 
in the United States, for example, there is an official Department 
of Defense directive that sets out policy for the development and 
use of autonomy in weapons . Additionally, the U.S. Law of War 
Manual notes that humans are the primary bearers of responsibility 
for attacks in armed conflict . The International Committee of the 
Red Cross has adopted a similar position, a stance that presumably 
implies some minimum necessary degree of human involvement 
in the use of force . While such arms control discussions and 
norm development processes are critical, they are unlikely to stop 
motivated non-state actors from conducting attacks.
Physical defenses 
In the physical sphere, there are many possible defenses against 
attacks via robots, though they are imperfect and unevenly 
distributed at present. Many are expensive and/or require human 
labor to deploy, and hence are only used to defend “hard targets” 
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like safety-critical facilities and infrastructure (e.g. airports), 
the owners of which can afford to invest in such protection, as 
opposed to the much more widely distributed “soft targets” 
(such as highly populated areas). Physical defenses can include 
detection via radar, lidar, acoustic signature, or image recognition 
software ; interception through various means ; and passive 
defense through physical hardening or nets. The U.S. Department 
of Defense has recently launched a major program to defend 
against drones, and has tested lasers and nets with an eye towards 
defending against drones from the Islamic State in particular . 
Given the potential for automation to allow attacks at scale, a 
particular challenge for defenders is finding effective methods 
of defense with an acceptable cost-exchange ratio . As of yet, 
these defenses are incomplete and expensive, suggesting a likely 
near-term gap between the ease of attack and defense outside of 
heavily guarded facilities that are known targets (e.g. airports or 
military bases). 
Payload control 
An actor who wants to launch an aerial drone attack carrying a 
dangerous payload must source both the drone and the payload. 
Developed countries generally have long-lasting and reasonably 
effective systems to restrict access to potentially explosive 
materials, and are introducing systems to restrict access to 
acids (following high-profile acid attacks). More generally, state 
security and intelligence services uncover and foil a large number 
of attempted attacks, including those that involve attempts to 
procure dangerous materials. Increases in AI capabilities will 
likely help their work e.g. in analysing signal intelligence, or in 
characterising and tracking possible attackers.
Political Security
Next, we discuss the political risks associated with malicious AI 
use. AI enables changes in the nature of communication between 
individuals, firms, and states, such that they are increasingly 
mediated by automated systems that produce and present content. 
Information technology is already affecting political institutions in 
myriad ways — e.g. the role of social media in elections, protests, 
and even foreign policy . The increasing use of AI may make 
existing trends more extreme, and enable new kinds of political 
dynamics. Worryingly, the features of AI described earlier such as 
its scalability make it particularly well suited to undermining public 
discourse through the large-scale production of persuasive but 
false content, and strengthening the hand of authoritarian regimes. 
We consider several types of defenses, but as yet, as in the cases 
of Digital Security and Physical Security, the problem is unsolved.
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Context
There are multiple points of intersection between existing 
information technologies and the political sphere. Historically, 
politics and instability have had a symbiotic relationship with 
technological advances. Security needs have driven technological 
advances, and new technology has also changed the kinds of 
security threats that states and politicians face. Examples abound 
including the advent of the semaphore telegraph in Napoleonic 
France , to the advent of GPS and its use during the First Gulf War , 
to the use of social media during the Arab Spring . Technological 
advances can change the balance of power between states, as 
well as the relationship between incumbent leaders and protesters 
seeking to challenge them. Modern militaries and intelligence 
agencies use today’s information technologies for surveillance,  
as they did with previous generations of technologies such  
as telephones. 
However, the effects of new technologies on these power 
relations are not straightforward. For example, social media 
technologies empower both incumbents and protesters: they 
allow military intelligences to monitor sentiment and attitudes, 
and to communicate more quickly; however, they also provide 
protesters in places such as Ukraine and Egypt, and rebel groups 
and revolutionary movements such as ISIS or Libyan rebels, the 
ability to get their message out to sympathetic supporters around 
the world more quickly and easily. In addition, research suggests 
that social media may empower incumbent authoritarian regimes , 
as incumbent governments can manipulate the information that 
the public sees. Finally, some have argued that social media has 
further polarized political discourse, allowing users, particularly in 
the West, to self-select into their own echo chambers, while others 
have questioned this assumption . Machine learning algorithms 
running on these platforms prioritize content that users are 
expected to like. Thus the dynamics we observe today are likely 
to only accelerate as these algorithms and AI become even more 
sophisticated. 
While they have evolved from previous technologies, information 
communication technologies are notable in some respects, such 
as the ease of information copying and transmission. Waltzmann 
writes, “The ability to influence is now effectively ‘democratized,’ 
since any individual or group can communicate and influence large 
numbers of others online” . This “democratization” of influence 
is not necessarily favorable to democracy, however. It is very easy 
today to spread manipulative and false information, and existing 
approaches for detecting and stopping the spread of “fake news” 
fall short. Other structural aspects of modern technologies and the 
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media industry also enable these trends. Marwick and Lewis (2017) 
note that the media’s “dependence on social media, analytics 
and metrics, sensationalism, novelty over newsworthiness, and 
clickbait makes them vulnerable to such media manipulation.” 
Others, such as Morozov (2012) and King, Pan, and Roberts (2017) 
argue that social media provides more tools for authorities to 
manipulate the news environment and control the message.      
Finally, we note that the extent and nature of the use of information 
communication technologies to alter political dynamics varies 
across types of political regimes. In liberal democracies, it can be 
thought of as more of an emergent phenomenon, arising from a 
complex web of industry, government, and other actors, whereas 
in states like China, there is an explicit and deliberate effort to 
shape online and in-person political discussions, making use of 
increasingly sophisticated technologies to do so . For instance, 
the Chinese government is exploring ways to leverage online and 
offline data to distill a “social credit score” for its citizens, and the 
generally more widespread use of censorship in China exemplifies 
the more explicit leveraging of technology for political purposes in 
some authoritarian states .
How AI Changes the Political Security Landscape
AI will cause changes in the political security landscape, as the 
arms race between production and detection of misleading 
information evolves and states pursue innovative ways of 
leveraging AI to maintain their rule. It is not clear what the long-
term implications of such malicious uses of AI will be, and these 
discrete instances of misuse only scratch the surface of the 
political implications of AI more broadly . However, we hope 
that understanding the landscape of threats will encourage more 
vigorous prevention and mitigation measures. 
Already, there are indications of how actors are using digital 
automation to shape political discourse. The widespread use of 
social media platforms with low barriers to entry makes it easier 
for AI systems to masquerade as people with political views. This 
has led to the widespread use of social media “bots” to spread 
political messages and cause dissent. At the moment, many such 
bots are controlled by humans who manage a large pack of bots , 
or use very simple forms of automation. However, these bot-based 
strategies (even when using relatively unsophisticated automation) 
are leveraged by national intelligence agencies and have 
demonstrated the ability to influence mainstream media coverage 
and political beliefs . For instance, during both the Syrian Civil 
War  and the 2016 US election bots appeared to actively try to 
sway public opinion . 
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Greater scale and sophistication of autonomous software actors 
in the political sphere is technically possible with existing AI 
techniques . As previously discussed, progress in automated 
spear phishing has demonstrated that automatically generated 
text can be effective at fooling humans , and indeed very simple 
approaches can be convincing to humans, especially when the 
text pertains to certain topics such as entertainment . It is unclear 
to what extent political bots succeed in shaping public opinion, 
especially as people become more aware of their existence, but 
there is evidence they contribute significantly to the propagation 
of fake news . 
In addition to enabling individuals and groups to mislead the 
public about the degree of support for certain perspectives, AI 
creates new opportunities to enhance “fake news” (although, of 
course, propaganda does not require AI systems to be effective). 
AI systems may simplify the production of high-quality fake 
video footage of, for example, politicians saying appalling (fake) 
things . Currently, the existence of high-quality recorded video 
or audio evidence is usually enough to settle a debate about what 
happened in a given dispute, and has been used to document 
war crimes in the Syrian Civil War . At present, recording 
and authentication technology still has an edge over forgery 
technology. A video of a crime being committed can serve as 
highly compelling evidence even when provided by an otherwise 
untrustworthy source. In the future, however, AI-enabled high-
quality forgeries may challenge the “seeing is believing” aspect 
of video and audio evidence. They might also make it easier for 
people to deny allegations against them, given the ease with which 
the purported evidence might have been produced.  In addition 
to augmenting dissemination of misleading information, the 
writing and publication of fake news stories could be automated, 
as routine financial and sports reporting often are today. As 
production and dissemination of high-quality forgeries becomes 
increasingly low-cost, synthetic multimedia may constitute a large 
portion of the media and information ecosystem. 
Even if bot users only succeed in decreasing trust in online 
environments, this will create a strategic advantage for political 
ideologies and groups that thrive in low-trust societies or feel 
opposed by traditional media channels. Authoritarian regimes 
in particular may benefit from an information landscape where 
objective truth becomes devalued and “truth” is whatever 
authorities claim it to be.
Moreover, automated natural language and multimedia production 
will allow AI systems to produce messages to be targeted at those 
most susceptible to them. This will be an extension of existing 
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advertising practices. Public social media profiles are already 
reasonably predictive of personality details , and may be usable to 
predict psychological conditions like depression . Sophisticated AI 
systems might allow groups to target precisely the right message 
at precisely the right time in order to maximize persuasive 
potential. Such a technology is sinister when applied to voting 
intention, but pernicious when applied to recruitment for terrorist 
acts, for example. Even without advanced techniques, “digital 
gerrymandering”  or other forms of advertising might shape 
elections in ways that undermine the democratic process.
The more entrenched position of authoritarian regimes offers 
additional mechanisms for control through AI that are unlikely to be 
as easily available in democracies . AI systems enable fine-grained 
surveillance at a more efficient scale . While existing systems are 
able to gather data on most citizens, efficiently using the data is 
too costly for many authoritarian regimes. AI systems both improve 
the ability to prioritise attention (for example, by using network 
analysis to identify current or potential leaders of subversive 
groups ) and also reduce the cost of monitoring individuals (for 
example, using systems that identify salient video clips and bring 
them to the attention of human agents). Furthermore, this can be 
a point of overlap between political and physical security, since 
robotic systems could also allow highly resourced groups to 
enforce a greater degree of compliance on unwilling populations.
The information ecosystem itself enables political manipulation 
and control by filtering content available to users. In authoritarian 
regimes, this could be done by the state or by private parties 
operating under rules and directions issued by the state. In 
democracies, the state may have limited legal authority to shape 
and influence information content but the same technical tools 
still exist; they simply reside in the hands of corporations. Even 
without resorting to outright censorship, media platforms could 
still manipulate public opinion by “de-ranking” or promoting certain 
content. For example, Alphabet Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt 
recently stated that Google would de-rank content produced 
by Russia Today and Sputnik . In 2014, Facebook manipulated 
the newsfeeds of over half a million users in order to alter the 
emotional content of users’ posts, albeit modestly . While such 
tools could be used to help filter out malicious content or fake 
news, they also could be used by media platforms to manipulate 
public opinion .
Finally, the threats to digital and physical security that we have 
described in previous sections may also have worrying implications 
for political security. The hacking of the Clinton campaign in the 
2016 presidential election is a recent example of how successful 
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cyberattacks can cause political disruption. The disruptive 
potential of physical attacks, such as assassinations and acts of 
terror, is even clearer. Such threats to digital and physical security 
might either undermine existing political institutions or allow them 
to justify a move toward more authoritarian policies.
Points of Control and Existing Countermeasures
Several measures are already in development or deployed in this 
area, though none has yet definitively addressed the problems. 
We highlight a few relevant efforts here, and emphasize that 
these proposals are oriented towards the protection of healthy 
public discourse in democracies. Preventing more authoritarian 
governments from making full use of AI seems to be an even more 
daunting challenge. 
Technical tools. Technical measures are in development for 
detecting forgeries  and social media bots . Likewise, the use of 
certified authenticity of images and videos, e.g. the ability to prove 
that a video was broadcast live rather than synthesized offline  
are valuable levers for ensuring that media is in fact produced by 
the relevant person or organization and is untampered in transit. 
Analogous measures have been developed for authentication of 
images (rather than videos) by Naveh and Tromer (2016). 
Automated fake news detection is likewise the subject of ongoing 
research  as well as a competition, the Fake News Challenge , 
which can be expected to spur further innovation in this area. As 
yet, however, the detection of misleading news and images is 
an unsolved problem, and the pace of innovation in generating 
apparently authentic multimedia and text is rapid.
Pervasive use of security measures. Encryption is a generally 
useful measure for ensuring the security of information 
transmissions, and is actively used by many companies and other 
organizations, in part to prevent the sorts of risks discussed here. 
The use of citizens’ data by intelligence agencies takes various 
forms and has been actively debated, especially in the wake of the 
Snowden revelations . 
General interventions to improve discourse. There are various 
proposals to increase the quality of discourse in the public and 
private spheres, including longstanding ones such as better 
education and teaching of critical thinking skills, as well as newer 
ones ranging from tools for tracking political campaigning in social 
media (such as “Who Targets Me?” ) to policy proposals  to apps 
for encouraging constructive dialogue .
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Kashyap et al., 2017; D’Avino et 
al., 2017
Varol et al, 2017
Rahman et al., 2017
Clarke et al, 2013
Shu et al., 2017; Pérez-Rosas et 
al., 2017; Zubiaga et al., 2017
5 The Fake News Challenge is a competition aimed at fostering the 
development of AI tools to help human 
fact checkers combat fake news.
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Sunstein, 2017
Ixy, 2017
7 “Who Targets Me?” is a software 
service that informs citizens on 
the extent with which they are 
being targeted by dark advertising 
campaigns.
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Media platforms. There have always been news sources of varying 
impartiality, and some online sources have better reputations 
than others, yet this has not entirely stopped the spread of fake 
news. Likewise, most people are aware of the existence of Ponzi 
schemes, scam emails, misleading sales tactics, etc. and yet 
victims are still found. Part of the reason that spam is less of a 
problem today than it otherwise could be is that the owners of 
key platforms such as email servers have deployed sophisticated 
spam filters. More generally, technology companies, social 
media websites, and and media organizations are critical points 
of control for stemming the tide of increasingly automated 
disinformation, censorship, and persuasion campaigns. Additionally, 
these organizations have unique datasets that will be useful for 
developing AI systems for detecting such threats, and through 
the ability to control access, they can pursue other strategies for 
preventing malicious uses of these platforms such as imposing 
strong barriers to entry (e.g. the use of one’s offline identity) and 
limiting the rate at which accounts can disseminate information. 
Because these media platforms are for-profit corporations, 
public discourse, transparency, and potentially regulation will 
be important mechanisms for ensuring that their use of these 
powerful tools aligns with public interest .
A development that occurred during the process of writing 
this report is illustrative. Late 2017 saw the rise of “deepfakes,” 
the application of face-swapping algorithms to (among other 
applications) adult videos. While such videos first began appearing 
en masse in Reddit fora clearly labeled as being fictitious, the 
realism of some such deepfakes is an early sign of the potential 
decline of “seeing is believing” discussed above. After substantial 
media coverage of deepfakes, Reddit and other online websites, 
including adult content websites, began to crack down on the 
discussion and propagation of the technique. While these efforts 
have not been fully successful, they illustrate the critical role of 
technology platforms in governing information access, and it is 
likely that the deepfakes crackdown at least somewhat slowed the 
dissemination of the tool and its products, at least amongst less 
sophisticated actors.
4 Lapowsky, 2017
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We identify a wide range of potential responses to the challenges 
raised above, as well as a large number of areas for further 
investigation. This section first makes several initial high-level 
recommendations for AI and ML researchers, policymakers, 
and others. We then suggest specific priority areas for further 
research, where investigation and analysis could develop and refine 
potential interventions to reduce risks posed by malicious use.
Due to the exploratory nature of this report, our primary aim is to 
draw attention to areas and potential interventions that we believe 
should be the subject of further investigation, rather than to make 
highly specific technical or policy proposals that may not be viable. 
The structure of this section, and the inclusion of Appendix B with 
additional exploratory material, is informed by this perspective.
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Recommendations
In this subsection we present four high-level recommendations, 
which are focused on strengthening the dialog between technical 
researchers, policymakers, and other stakeholders. In the following 
subsection, we will turn our attention to more concrete priority 
areas for technical work as well as associated research questions.
Our first pair of recommendations arise from the fact that 
the issues raised in this report combine technical and non-
technical considerations, such as social, economic and military 
considerations. Concerns were raised at the workshop that the 
development of viable, appropriate responses to these issues may 
be hampered by two self-reinforcing factors: first, a lack of deep 
technical understanding on the part of policymakers, potentially 
leading to poorly-designed or ill-informed regulatory, legislative, or 
other policy responses; second, reluctance on the part of technical 
researchers to engage with these topics, out of concern that 
association with malicious use would tarnish the reputation of the 
field and perhaps lead to reduced funding or premature regulation. 
Our first two recommendations aim at preempting this dynamic.
Recommendation #1: Policymakers should collaborate closely 
with technical researchers to investigate, prevent, and mitigate 
potential malicious uses of AI. This must include policymakers 
taking seriously their responsibility to avoid implementing 
measures that will interfere with or impede research progress, 
unless those measures are likely to bring commensurate benefits. 
Close collaboration with technical experts also ensures that 
policy responses will be informed by the technical realities of the 
technologies at hand .
Recommendation #2: Researchers and engineers in artificial 
intelligence should take the dual-use nature of their work 
seriously, allowing misuse-related considerations to influence 
research priorities and norms, and proactively reaching out to 
relevant actors when harmful applications are foreseeable. Given 
that AI is a dual-use technology, we believe it is important that 
researchers consider it their responsibility to take whatever steps 
they can to help promote beneficial uses of the technology and 
prevent harmful uses. Example steps could include engaging with 
policymakers to provide expertise, and considering the potential 
applications of different research projects before deciding what to 
work on. (We recognize and appreciate the many AI researchers — 
including the technical experts who took part in the workshop and 
contributed to this report and other related initiatives — who are 
already doing outstanding work along these lines. )
Introductory resources for 
policymakers interested in this domain 
are increasingly becoming available, 
both generally about AI (Buchanan 
and Taylor, 2017), and specifically 
on AI and security (CNAS, 2017). As 
an example of policymaking in this 
domain that has surfaced several 
difficulties, the European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulation 
is a commonly-discussed example of 
a policy that is hard to interpret 
and apply in the context of current 
machine learning algorithms (Goodman 
and Flaxman, 2016).
1
The work of the Partnership on AI, the 
White House’s 2016 series of workshops 
on AI, the 2017 “Beneficial AI” 
conference in Asilomar, and the AI Now 
conference series and organization are 
further examples where contributions 
from technical experts have been 
substantial and valuable.
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We also make two recommendations laying out aims that we 
believe the broader AI community (including both technical and 
policy professionals) should work towards.
Recommendation #3: Best practices should be identified in 
research areas with more mature methods for addressing dual-
use concerns, such as computer security, and imported where 
applicable to the case of AI. An example of a best practice that 
workshop participants considered clearly valuable to introduce 
into AI contexts is extensive use of “red teaming.”  See Priority 
Research Area #1, below, for further details.
Recommendation #4: Actively seek to expand the range of 
stakeholders and domain experts involved in discussions of 
these challenges. This could include reaching out to sectors like 
civil society, national security experts, as-yet unengaged AI and 
cybersecurity researchers, businesses incorporating AI into their 
products, ethicists, the general public , and others, to ensure that 
relevant stakeholders are included and relevant experts consulted. 
Because of the dual-use nature of AI, many of the malicious uses 
of AI outlined in this report have related legitimate uses. In some 
cases, the difference between legitimate and illegitimate uses of AI 
could be one of degree or ensuring appropriate safeguards against 
malicious use. For example, surveillance tools can be used to catch 
terrorists or oppress ordinary citizens. Information content filters 
could be used to bury fake news or manipulate public opinion. 
Governments and powerful private actors will have access to many 
of these AI tools and could use them for public good or harm. This 
is why a public dialogue on appropriate uses of AI technology is 
critical. The above four recommendations can help foster a cross-
disciplinary dialogue among AI researchers, policymakers, and 
other relevant stakeholders to ensure that AI technology is used  
to benefit society.  
Priority Areas for Further Research
This section lays out specific topic areas that we recommend 
be investigated further. We aim here for brevity; more specific 
questions for investigation, along with additional context and 
commentary on many of the topics mentioned, may be found in 
Appendix B. 
 
 
 
In computer security, red teaming 
involves a “red team”, composed of 
security experts and/or members of 
the host organization, deliberately 
planning and carrying out attacks 
against the systems and practices 
of the organization (with some 
limitations to prevent lasting 
damage), with an optional “blue team” 
responding to these attacks. These 
exercises explore what an actual 
attack might look like in order to 
better understand and, ultimately, 
improve the security of the 
organisation’s systems and practices.
We expect adaptive defensive actions 
will be required of everyday citizens, 
if only in terms of maintaining 
awareness of threats and adopting 
best practices. It is important to 
acknowledge that different communities 
will have varying abilities to 
make such adaptations, depending 
for example on their technological 
literacy, which may pose challenges 
for implementing security policies. 
This is important not just for the 
communities less able to adapt 
to the new threats, but also for 
society more broadly as, for example, 
insecure systems may be compromised 
by attackers and repurposed to provide 
computing power and data for yet-
more-capable attacks, while reducing 
the possibility that the attacks could 
be attributed, as they would then seem 
to originate from the compromised 
system.
1
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Priority Research Area #1: 
Learning from and with the Cybersecurity Community
As AI-based systems become more widespread and capable, 
the potential impacts of cybersecurity incidents are growing 
commensurately. To summarize the considerations in the Digital 
Security section, AI is important to cybersecurity for three reasons. 
First, increased automation brings with it increased digital control 
of physical systems; consider, for example, how much more control 
a successful hacker could exercise over a modern car, compared 
with a typical car from 20 years ago . Second, successful attacks 
on AI-based systems can also give the attacker access to the 
algorithms and/or trained models used by the system; consider, for 
example, theft of the datasets used for facial recognition on social 
networks, or the compromise of an algorithm used for analysing 
satellite imagery. Third, increasing use of AI in cyberattacks is likely 
to allow highly sophisticated attacks to be carried out at a much 
larger scale, which may reach victims that would otherwise not be 
suitable targets of previous waves of sophisticated attacks.
To respond to these increased dangers, cybersecurity must be a 
major and ongoing priority in efforts to prevent and mitigate harms 
from AI systems, and best practices from cybersecurity must be 
ported over wherever applicable to AI systems.
Some examples of cybersecurity-related sub-areas that we believe 
should be the subject of further research and analysis, then be 
implemented as appropriate (see Appendix B for more commentary 
on and questions about these sub-areas), include: 
• Red teaming. Extensive use of red teaming to discover and fix 
potential security vulnerabilities and safety issues should be a 
priority of AI developers, especially in critical systems.
• Formal verification. To what extent, in what circumstances, and 
for what types of architectures can formal verification be used 
to prove key properties of AI systems? Can other approaches be 
developed to achieve similar goals by different means?
• Responsible disclosure of AI vulnerabilities. Should AI-specific 
procedures be established to enable confidential reporting 
of vulnerabilities discovered in AI systems (including security 
vulnerabilities, potential adversarial inputs, and other types of 
exploits), as is already possible for security exploits in modern 
software systems?
• Forecasting security-relevant capabilities. Could “white-hat” 
efforts to predict how AI advances will enable more effective 
DARPA’s Assured Autonomy program 
(Neema, 2017) is one attempt at 
developing techniques to assure safety 
in systems that continue learning 
throughout their lifespans, which 
makes assurance or verification using 
traditional methods challenging. See 
also Katz et al., 2017; Selsam, Liang, 
and Dill, 2017; and Carlini et al., 
2017.
For example, see the case of 
hackers first bringing a Jeep to a 
standstill on a busy highway, then 
later developing the ability to 
cause unintended acceleration and 
fully control the vehicle’s steering 
(Greenberg, 2016).
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cyberattacks, and more rigorous tracking of AI progress and 
proliferation  in general, allow for more effective preparations 
by defenders?
• Security tools. What tools (if any) should be developed and 
distributed to help make it standard to test for common security 
problems in AI systems, analogously to tools used by computer 
security professionals?
• Secure hardware. Could security features be incorporated into 
AI-specific hardware, for example to prevent copying, restrict 
access, facilitate activity audits, and similar? How technically 
and practically feasible is the design and adoption of hardware 
with properties like this?
Priority Research Area #2:
Exploring Different Openness Models
Today, the prevailing norms in the machine learning research 
community strongly point towards openness. A large fraction of 
novel research is published online in papers that share anything 
from rough architectural outlines to algorithmic details to source 
code. This level of openness has clear benefits in terms of enabling 
researchers to build on each others’ work, promoting collaboration, 
and allowing theoretical progress to be incorporated into a broad 
array of applications.
However, the potential misuses of AI technology surveyed in the 
Scenarios and Security Domains sections suggest a downside 
to openly sharing all new capabilities and algorithms by default: 
it increases the power of tools available to malicious actors. This 
raises an important research question: might it be appropriate to 
abstain from or merely delay publishing of some findings related to 
AI for security reasons? There is precedent for this in fields such 
as computer security, where exploits that could affect important 
systems are not publicly disclosed until the developers have had 
an opportunity to fix the vulnerability. To the extent that research 
results are withheld today in AI, it is usually for reasons related to 
intellectual property (e.g. in order to avoid a future result being 
“scooped”). In light of risks laid out elsewhere in this report, there 
may also be arguments based on public interest for additional 
caution in at least some cases.
While the proposals below consider decreasing openness in certain 
situations, we stress that there are clear and well-recognized 
reasons to favor openness in research communities. We believe 
that policies leading to decreased openness, while potentially 
1 Eckersley and Nasser et al., 2017
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appropriate in certain instances, should be sensitive to these 
benefits. Rather than propose a specific solution, our aim is to 
foster discussion of whether and when considerations against 
open sharing might outweigh considerations in favor and what 
mechanisms might enable this.
Some potential mechanisms and models that could be subject 
to further investigation and analysis (see Appendix B for more 
commentary on and questions about for these sub-areas) include:
• Pre-publication risk assessment in technical areas of special 
concern. Should some types of AI research results, such 
as work specifically related to digital security or adversarial 
machine learning, be subject to some kind of risk assessment 
to determine what level of openness is appropriate ? This is 
the norm for research in other areas, such as biotechnology and 
computer security. Or would such measures be premature today, 
before AI systems are more widely used in critical systems 
and we have better knowledge of which technical research is 
most security-relevant? If such measures are considered be 
premature, under what conditions would they be appropriate?
• Central access licensing models. Could emerging “central 
access” commercial structures — in which customers use 
services like sentiment analysis or image recognition made 
available by a central provider without having access to the 
technical details of the system — provide a template for a 
security-focused sharing model that allows widespread use of a 
given capability while reducing the possibility of malicious use? 
How might such a model remain viable over time as advances in 
processing power, data storage and availability, and embedded 
expertise allow a larger set of actors to use AI tools?
• Sharing regimes that favor safety and security. Could 
arrangements be made under which some types of research 
results are selectively shared among a predetermined set of 
people and organizations that meet certain criteria, such as 
effective information security and adherence to appropriate 
ethical norms? For example, certain forms of offensive 
cybersecurity research that leverage AI might be shared 
between trusted organizations for vulnerability discovery 
purposes, but would be harmful if more widely distributed.
• Other norms and institutions that have been applied to dual-
use technologies. What can be learned from other models, 
methodologies, considerations, and cautions that have 
arisen when tackling similar issues raised by other dual-use 
technologies? 
Accordingly, concerns about misuse 
should not be used as an excuse to 
reduce openness to a greater extent 
than is required, for instance, when 
the real motivation is about corporate 
competitiveness. We believe that, 
to the extent that practices around 
openness are rethought, this should 
be done transparently, and that when 
new approaches are incorporated into 
AI research and publication processes 
from other domains (e.g. responsible 
disclosure), those doing so should 
state their reasons publicly so 
that a range of stakeholders can 
evaluate these claims. The debate in 
the biosecurity community about the 
appropriate level of disclosure on 
gain-of-function research (in which 
organisms are made more dangerous in 
order to understand certain threats 
better) provides a model of the kind 
of discussion we see as healthy and 
necessary.
1
2 see e.g. NDSS, 2018
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Priority Research Area #3: 
Promoting a Culture of Responsibility
AI researchers and the organizations that employ them are in 
a unique position to shape the security landscape of the AI-
enabled world. Many in the community already take their social 
responsibility quite seriously, and encourage others to do the 
same. This should be continued and further developed, with 
greater leveraging of insights from the experiences of other 
technical fields, and with greater attentiveness to malicious use 
risks in particular. Throughout training, recruitment, research, and 
development, individuals, and institutions should be mindful of the 
risks of malicious uses of AI capabilities.
Some initial areas to explore for concrete initiatives aimed at 
fostering a culture of responsibility include :
• Education. What formal and informal methods for educating 
scientists and engineers about the ethical and socially 
responsible use of their technology are most effective?  
How could this training be best incorporated into the education 
of AI researchers?
• Ethical statements and standards. What role should ethical 
statements and standards play in AI research?  How and by 
whom should they be implemented and enforced? What are 
the domain-specific ethical questions in the areas of digital, 
physical, and security that need to be resolved in order to 
distinguish between benign and malicious uses of AI?
• Whistleblowing measures. What is the track record of 
whistleblowing protections in other domains, and how (if at all) 
might they be used for preventing AI-related misuse risks?
• Nuanced narratives. More generally, are there succinct and 
compelling narratives of AI research and its impacts that can 
balance optimism about the vast potential of this technology 
with a level-headed recognition of the risks it poses? Examples 
of existing narratives include the “robot apocalypse” trope and 
the countervailing “automation boon” trope, both of which 
have obvious shortcomings. Might a narrative like “dual-use” 
(proposed above) be more productive?
Two examples of proposed standards  
for AI are the IEEE Global Initiative 
for Ethical Considerations in 
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous 
Systems (IEEE Standards Association, 
2017) and the development of the 
Asilomar AI Principles (Future of Life 
Institute, 2017).
See Appendix B for more commentary on 
and questions about these sub-areas.
2
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Priority Research Area #4: 
Developing Technological and Policy Solutions
In addition to creating new security challenges and threats 
progress in AI also makes possible new types of responses and 
defenses. These technological solutions must be accompanied and 
supported by well-designed policy responses. In addition to the 
proposals mentioned in the previous sections, what other potential 
approaches — both institutional and technological — could help to 
prevent and mitigate potential misuse of AI technologies?
Some initial suggested areas for further investigation include : 
• Privacy protection. What role can technical measures play in 
protecting privacy from bad actors in a world of AI? What role 
must be played by institutions, whether by corporations, the 
state, or others?
• Coordinated use of AI for public-good security. Can AI-based 
defensive security measures be distributed widely to nudge the 
offense-defense balance in the direction of defense?  Via what 
institutions or mechanisms can these technologies be promoted 
and shared?
• Monitoring of AI-relevant resources. Under what circumstances, 
and for which resources, might it be feasible and appropriate 
to monitor inputs to AI technologies such as hardware, talent, 
code, and data?
• Other legislative and regulatory responses. What other potential 
interventions by policymakers would be productive in this space 
(e.g. adjusting legal definitions of hacking to account for the 
case of adversarial examples and data poisoning attacks)? 
For all of the above, it will be necessary to incentivize individuals 
and organizations with the relevant expertise to pursue these 
investigations. An initial step, pursued by this report, is to raise 
awareness of the issues and their importance, and to lay out an 
initial research agenda. Further steps will require commitment from 
individuals and organizations with relevant expertise and a proven 
track record. Additional monetary resources, both public and 
private, would also help to seed interest and recruit attention in 
relevant research communities.
For example, could AI systems be used 
to refactor existing code bases or 
new software to adhere more closely 
to principle of least authority 
(Miller, 2006) or other security best 
practices?
See Appendix B for more commentary on 
and questions about these sub-areas.
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When considered together, how will the security-relevant 
characteristics of AI and the various intervention measures 
surveyed above (if implemented) combine to shape the future  
of security? Any confident long-term prediction is impossible  
to make, as significant uncertainties remain regarding the 
progress of various technologies, the strategies adopted by 
malicious actors, and the steps that should and will be taken by 
key stakeholders. Nonetheless, we aim to elucidate some crucial 
considerations for giving a more confident answer, and make 
several hypotheses about the medium-term equilibrium of AI attack 
and defense. By medium-term, we mean the time period (5+ years 
from now) after which malicious applications of AI are widely 
used and defended against, but before AI has yet progressed 
sufficiently to fully obviate the need for human input in either 
attack or defense.
05 StrategicAnalysis
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Even a seemingly stable and predictable medium-term equilibrium 
resulting from foreseeable AI developments might be short-lived, 
since both technological and policy factors will progress beyond 
what can currently be foreseen. New developments, including 
technological developments unrelated to AI, may ultimately be 
more impactful than the capabilities considered in this report. 
Nevertheless, we hope that the analysis below sheds some light  
on key factors to watch and influence in the years to come.
Factors Affecting the Equilibrium of AI and 
Security
Attacker Access to Capabilities
Current trends emphasize widespread open access to cutting-edge 
research and development achievements. If these trends continue 
for the next 5 years, we expect the ability of attackers to cause 
harm with digital and robotic systems significantly increase. This 
follows directly from the dual-use nature, efficiency, scalability, and 
ease of diffusing AI technologies discussed previously.
However, we expect the dual-use nature of the technology will 
become increasingly apparent to developers and regulators, 
and that limitations on access to or malicious use of powerful AI 
technologies will be increasingly imposed. However, significant 
uncertainty remains about the effectiveness of attempting to 
restrict or monitor access through any particular intervention. 
Preemptive design efforts and the use of novel organizational 
and technological measures within international policing will 
all help, and are likely to emerge at various stages, in response 
(hopefully) to reports such as these, or otherwise in the aftermath 
of a significant attack or scandal. Efforts to prevent malicious 
uses solely through limiting AI code proliferation are unlikely to 
succeed fully, both due to less-than-perfect compliance and 
because sufficiently motivated and well resourced actors can use 
espionage to obtain such code. However, the risk from less capable 
actors using AI can likely be reduced through a combination of 
interventions aimed at making systems more secure, responsibly 
disclosing developments that could be misused, and increasing 
threat awareness among policymakers.
Existence of AI-Enabled Defenses
The same characteristics of AI that enable large-scale and low-cost 
attacks also allow for more scalable defenses. Specific instances of 
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AI-enabled defenses have been discussed in earlier sections, such 
as spam filters and malware detection, and we expect many others 
will be developed in the coming years. For example, in the context 
of physical security, the use of drones whose sole purpose is to 
quickly and non-violently “catch” and bring to the ground other 
drones might be invented and widely deployed, but they might also 
turn out to be prohibitively expensive, as might other foreseeable 
defenses. Thus, both the pace of technical innovation and the cost 
of such defenses should be considered in a fuller assessment.
One general category of AI-enabled defenses worth considering 
in an overall assessment is the use of AI in criminal investigations 
and counterterrorism. AI is already beginning to see wider adoption 
for a wide range of law enforcement purposes, such as facial 
recognition by surveillance cameras and social network analysis. 
We have hardly seen the end of such advancements, and further 
developments in the underlying technologies and their widespread 
use seem likely given the interest of actors from corporations to 
governments in preventing criminal acts. Additionally, interceding 
attacks in their early stage through rapid detection and response 
may turn out to be cheaper than for example widely deploying 
physical defenses against drones. Thus, the growing ability of 
states to detect and stop criminal acts, in part by leveraging AI, is a 
key variable in the medium-term. However, such advances will not 
help prevent authoritarian abuses of AI.
Distribution and Generality of Defenses
Some defensive measures discussed in Interventions and 
Appendix B can be taken by single, internally coordinated actors, 
such as research labs and tech startups, and are likely to happen 
as soon as they become technically feasible and cost-effective. 
These measures could then be used by the organizations that 
have the most to lose from attacks such as governments and 
major corporations. This means that the most massive category 
of harm, such as attack on WMD facilities, is also the least likely, 
though the level of risk will depend on the relative rates at which 
attacks and defenses are developed. Responsible disclosure of 
novel vulnerabilities, pre-publication risk assessment, and a strong 
ethical culture in the AI community more generally will be vital in 
such a world. 
This, however, leaves out the strategic situation for the majority 
of potential victims: technologically conservative corporations, 
under-resourced states, SMEs, and individuals. For these potential 
victims, defensive measures need to be baked into widespread 
technology, which may require coordinated regulatory efforts, or 
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offered at low prices. The latter is most likely to come either from 
tech giants (as in the case of spam filters), which will increase 
lock-in and concentration of data and power, or from non-profit 
organizations who develop and distribute such defensive measures 
freely or cheaply (e.g. Mozilla’s Firefox web browser). 
This dynamic of defense through reliance on fortified software 
platforms is likely to be affected by the generality of defensive 
measures: if each attack requires a tailored defense, and has 
an associated higher time lag and skill investment, it is more 
likely that those developing such defensive measures will need 
financial backing, from corporations, investors, philanthropists, 
or governments. In the case of governments, international 
competition may hinder the development and release of defensive 
measures, as is generally the case in cyber-security, though see 
the release of CyberChef  and Assemblyline  as counterexamples. 
For political security, similar considerations regarding generality 
apply: a general solution to authenticable multimedia production 
and forgery detection would be more useful than tailored individual 
solutions for photographs, videos, or audio, or narrower subsets of 
those media types. 
Misaligned incentives can also lead to a failure to employ available 
defensive measures. For example, better cybersecurity defenses 
could raise the bar for data breaches or the creation of IoT device 
botnets. However, the individuals affected by these failures, such 
as the individuals whose personal data is released or victims 
of DDOS attacks using botnets, are not typically in a position 
to improve defenses directly. Thus, other approaches including 
regulation may be needed to adjust these incentives or otherwise 
address these externalities .
Overall Assessment
The range of plausible outcomes is extremely diverse, even without 
considering the outcomes that are less likely, but still possible. 
Across all plausible outcomes, we anticipate that attempts to use 
AI maliciously will increase alongside the increase in the use of AI 
across society more generally. This is not a trend that is particular 
to AI; we anticipate increased malicious use of AI just as criminals, 
terrorists and authoritarian regimes use electricity, software, and 
computer networks: at some point in the technology adoption 
cycle, it becomes easier to make use of such general purpose 
technologies than to avoid them.
On the optimistic side, several trends look positive for defense. 
There is much low hanging fruit to be picked in securing AI systems 
1
2
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GCHQ, 2016
CSE, 2017
Moore and Anderson, 2012
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themselves, and securing people and systems from AI-enabled 
attacks. Examples include responsible vulnerability disclosure for 
machine learning in cases where the affected ML technology is 
being used in critical systems, and greater efforts to leverage AI 
expertise in the discovery of vulnerabilities by software companies 
internally before they are discovered by adversaries. There are 
substantial academic incentives to tackle the hardest research 
problems, such as developing methods to address adversarial 
examples and providing provable guarantees for system properties 
and behaviors. There are, at least in some parts of the world, 
political incentives for developing processes and regulations that 
reduce threat levels and increase stability, e.g. through consumer 
protection and standardization. Finally, there are incentives for 
tech giants to collaborate on ensuring at least a minimal level of 
security for their users. Where solutions are visible, require limited 
or pre-existing coordination, and align with existing incentive 
structures, defenses are likely to prevail.
On the pessimistic side, not all of the threats identified have 
solutions with these characteristics. It is likely to prove much 
harder to secure humans from manipulation attacks than it will be 
to secure digital and cyber-physical systems from cyber attacks, 
and in some scenarios, all three attack vectors may be combined. 
In the absence of significant effort, attribution of attacks and 
penalization of attackers is likely to be difficult, which could lead 
to an ongoing state of low- to medium-level attacks, eroded trust 
within societies, between societies and their governments, and 
between governments. Whichever vectors of attack prove hardest 
to defend against will be the ones most likely to be weaponized by 
governments, and the proliferation of such offensive capability is 
likely to be broad. Since the number of possible attack surfaces 
is vast, and the cutting edge of capability is likely to be ever 
progressing, any equilibrium obtained between rival states or 
between criminals and security forces in a particular domain is 
likely to be short-lived as technology and policies evolve.
Tech giants and media giants may continue to become 
technological safe havens of the masses, as their access to 
relevant real-time data at massive scale, and their ownership of 
products and communication channels (along with the underlying 
technical infrastructure), place them in a highly privileged position 
to offer tailored protection to their customers. Other corporate 
giants that offer digitally-enhanced products and services 
(automotive, medical, defense, and increasingly many other 
sectors) will likely be under pressure to follow suit. This would 
represent a continuation of existing trends in which people very 
regularly interact with and use the platforms provided by tech and 
media giants, and interact less frequently with small businesses 
and governments.
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Nations will be under pressure to protect their citizens and their 
own political stability in the face of malicious uses of AI . This 
could occur through direct control of digital and communication 
infrastructure, through meaningful and constructive collaboration 
between the government and the private entities controlling such 
infrastructure, or through informed and enforceable regulation 
coupled with well-designed financial incentives and liability 
structures. Some countries have a clear head start in establishing 
the control mechanisms that will enable them to provide security 
for their citizens .
For some of the more challenging coordination and interdisciplinary 
problems, new leadership will be required to rise above local 
incentives and provide systemic vision. This will not be the first 
time humanity has risen to meet such a challenge: the NATO 
conference at Garmisch in 1968 created consensus around the 
growing risks from software systems, and sketched out technical 
and procedural solutions to address over-run, over-budget, 
hard-to-maintain and bug-ridden critical infrastructure software, 
resulting in many practices which are now mainstream in software 
engineering ; the NIH conference at Asilomar in 1975 highlighted 
the emerging risks from recombinant DNA research, promoted  
a moratorium on certain types of experiments, and initiated 
research into novel streams of biological containment, alongside  
a regulatory framework such research could feed into . Individuals 
at the forefront of research played key roles in both of these  
cases, including Edsger Dijkstra in the former  and Paul Berg  
in the latter .
There remain many disagreements between the co-authors of this 
report, let alone amongst the various expert communities out in the 
world. Many of these disagreements will not be resolved until we 
get more data as the various threats and responses unfold, but this 
uncertainty and expert disagreement should not paralyse us from 
taking precautionary action today. Our recommendations, stated 
above, can and should be acted on today: analyzing and (where 
appropriate) experimenting with novel openness models, learning 
from the experience of other scientific disciplines, beginning 
multi-stakeholder dialogues on the risks in particular domains, and 
accelerating beneficial research on myriad promising defenses.
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For example, France’s campaign laws 
prohibited Macron’s opponent from 
further campaigning once Macron’s 
emails had been hacked. This prevented 
the campaign from capitalizing on the 
leaks associated with the hack, and 
ended up with the hack playing a much 
more muted role in the French election 
than the Clinton hack played in the  
US election.
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While many uncertainties remain, it is clear that AI will figure 
prominently in the security landscape of the future, that 
opportunities for malicious use abound, and that more can and 
should be done. 
Artificial intelligence, digital security, physical security, and political 
security are deeply connected and will likely become more so.  
In the cyber domain,  even at current capability levels, AI can be 
used to augment attacks on and defenses of cyberinfrastructure, 
and its introduction into society changes the attack surface that 
hackers can target, as demonstrated by the examples of automated 
spear phishing and malware detection tools discussed above.  
As AI systems increase in capability, they will first reach and then 
exceed human capabilities in many narrow domains, as we have 
already seen with games like backgammon, chess, Jeopardy!, 
Dota 2, and Go and are now seeing with important human tasks 
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like investing in the stock market or driving cars. Preparing for the 
potential malicious uses of AI associated with this transition is  
an urgent task.
As AI systems extend further into domains commonly believed 
to be uniquely human (like social interaction), we will see more 
sophisticated social engineering attacks drawing on these 
capabilities. These are very difficult to defend against, as even 
cybersecurity experts can fall prey to targeted spear phishing 
emails. This may cause an explosion of network penetrations, 
personal data theft, and an epidemic of intelligent computer 
viruses. One of our best hopes to defend against automated 
hacking is also via AI, through automation of our cyber-defense 
systems, and indeed companies are increasingly pursuing this 
strategy. But AI-based defense is not a panacea, especially when 
we look beyond the digital domain. More work should also be done 
in understanding the right balance of openness in AI, developing 
improved technical measures for formally verifying the robustness 
of systems, and ensuring that policy frameworks developed in  
a less AI-infused world adapt to the new world we are creating. 
Looking to the longer term, much has been published about 
problems which might arise accidentally as a result of highly 
sophisticated AI systems capable of operating at high levels  
across a very wide range of environments , though AI capabilities 
fall short of this today. Given that intelligence systems can be 
deployed for a range of goals , highly capable systems that require 
little expertise to develop or deploy may eventually be given new, 
dangerous goals by hacking them or developing them de novo: 
that is, we may see powerful AI systems with a “just add your 
own goals” property. Depending on whose bidding such systems 
are doing, such advanced AIs may inflict unprecedented types 
and scales of damage in certain domains, requiring preparedness 
to begin today before these more potent misuse potentials are 
realizable. Researchers and policymakers should learn from other 
domains with longer experience in preventing and mitigating 
malicious use to develop tools, policies, and norms appropriate  
to AI applications. 
Though the specific risks of malicious use across the digital, 
physical, and political domains are myriad, we believe that 
understanding the commonalities across this landscape, including 
the role of AI in enabling larger-scale and more numerous attacks, 
is helpful in illuminating the world ahead and informing better 
prevention and mitigation efforts. We urge readers to consider 
ways in which they might be able to advance the collective 
understanding of the AI-security nexus, and to join the dialogue 
about ensuring that the rapid development of AI proceeds not just 
safely and fairly but also securely.
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Summary
On February 19 and 20, 2017, Miles Brundage of the Future of 
Humanity Institute (FHI) and Shahar Avin of the Centre for the 
Study of Existential Risk (CSER) co-chaired a workshop entitled 
“Bad Actor Risks in Artificial Intelligence” in Oxford, United 
Kingdom. The workshop was co-organized by FHI, CSER, and the 
Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence (CFI). Participants 
came from a wide variety of institutional and disciplinary 
backgrounds, and analyzed a variety of risks related to AI misuse. 
The workshop was held under Chatham House rules. 
Event Structure
On February 19, the event began with background presentations 
on cybersecurity, AI, and robotics from relevant experts in these 
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fields. A particular focus of the presentations was on highlighting 
underexplored risks. The afternoon featured two sets of breakout 
sessions: participants first discussed security domains and 
scenarios, and then discussed possible defenses. 
On February 20, a subset of the participants from the first day of 
the workshop met to discuss next steps and the prioritization of 
possible prevention and mitigation measures. The group present 
agreed upon the need for a research agenda to be produced, and 
voted on which measures seemed useful and tractable, in order to 
focus the subsequent report writing process. 
Report Writing Process
This document is based in large part on notes from the discussions 
at the workshop, as well as prior and subsequent research by the 
authors on the topic. Brundage and Avin et al. wrote a draft of the 
report and circulated it among all of the attendees at the workshop 
as well as additional domain experts. We are grateful to all of the 
workshop participants for their invaluable contributions, even if we 
were not able to capture all of their perspectives. 
List of Workshop Participants
Dario Amodei, OpenAI 
Ross Anderson, University of Cambridge 
Stuart Armstrong, Future of Humanity Institute 
Amanda Askell, Centre for Effective Altruism 
Shahar Avin, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk 
Miles Brundage, Future of Humanity Institute 
Joanna Bryson, University of Bath/Princeton University Center  
 for Information Technology Policy 
Jack Clark, OpenAI 
Guy Collyer, Organization for Global Biorisk Reduction 
Owen Cotton-Barratt, Future of Humanity Institute 
Rebecca Crootof, Yale Law School 
Allan Dafoe, Yale University 
Eric Drexler, Future of Humanity Institute 
Peter Eckersley, Electronic Frontier Foundation 
Ben Garfinkel, Future of Humanity Institute 
Carrick Flynn, Future of Humanity Institute 
Ulrike Franke, University of Oxford 
Dylan Hadfield-Menell, UC Berkeley and Center  
 for Human-compatible AI 
Richard Harknett, University of Oxford/University of Cincinnati 
Katja Hofmann, Microsoft Research 
Tim Hwang, Google
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Eva Ignatuschtschenko, University of Oxford 
Victoria Krakovna, DeepMind/Future of Life Institute 
Ben Laurie, DeepMind 
Jan Leike, DeepMind/Future of Humanity Institute 
Seán Ó hÉigeartaigh, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk 
Toby Ord, Future of Humanity Institute 
Michael Page, Centre for Effective Altruism 
Heather Roff, University of Oxford/Arizona State University 
 /New America Foundation 
Paul Scharre, Center for a New American Security 
Eden Shochat, Aleph VC 
Jaan Tallinn, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk 
Helen Toner, Open Philanthropy Project 
Andrew Trask, University of Oxford 
Roman Yampolskiy, University of Louisville 
Yueh-Hsuan Weng, Tohoku University
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This appendix gives additional commentary on topics related to 
the Recommendations and Priority Research Areas described in 
the Interventions section of the main report, along with some 
initial questions and directions for investigation on each topic. 
In each case, we flag which one or more of the three high-level 
threat factors (introduced in General Implications for the Threat 
Landscape) the research area aims to address. We include this 
content as a jumping-off point for researchers interested in making 
progress in these areas; the below is not intended to be exhaustive 
or conclusive.
Appendix B: 
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Dual Use Analogies and Case Studies
One possible area of theory, practice, and history to be explored 
for insights is the set of technologies with prominent concerns 
around dual use - technologies that can be used for both peaceful 
and military aims (or, more generally, to both beneficial and harmful 
ends). Examples include chemicals potentially useful for chemical 
weapons or explosives, biological engineering potentially useful 
for biological weapons, cryptography, and nuclear technologies. 
Allen and Chan  explored several of these case studies and their 
potential insights for AI dual-use policymaking. In these cases, 
there is a rich tapestry of soft norms (e.g. pre-publication review) 
and hard laws (e.g. export controls) developed over many years to 
ensure positive outcomes .
When consulting the history of governing dual use technologies, 
we should learn both constructive solutions from past successes, 
and precautionary lessons about poor regulation that should 
be avoided. A relevant example of the latter is the difficulties 
of regulating cryptographic algorithms and network security 
tools through export control measures such as the Wassenaar 
Arrangement . The similarities between AI and cryptography, in 
terms of running on general-purpose hardware, in terms of being 
immaterial objects (algorithms), in terms of having a very wide 
range of legitimate applications, and in their ability to protect 
as well as harm, suggest that the default control measures for 
AI might be similar those that have been historically applied to 
cryptography. This may well be a path we should avoid, or at least 
take very cautiously.
The apparent dual-use nature of AI technologies raises the 
following questions:
• What is the most appropriate level of analysis and governance 
of dual-use characteristics of AI technologies (e.g. the field as a 
whole, individual algorithms, hardware, software, data)?
• What norms from other dual-use domains are applicable to AI?
• What unique challenges, if any, does AI pose as a dual-use 
technology?
• Are there exemplary cases in which dual-use concerns were 
effectively addressed?
• What lessons can be learned from challenges and failures in 
applying control measures to dual-use technologies?
1
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Red Teaming
A common tool in cybersecurity and military practice is red 
teaming - a “red team” composed of security experts and/or 
members of the organization deliberately plans and carries out 
attacks against the systems and practices of the organization 
(with some limitations to prevent lasting damage), with an optional 
“blue team” responding to these attacks. These exercises explore 
what an actual attack might look like in order to ultimately better 
understand and improve the security of the organization’s systems 
and practices. Two subsets of the AI security domain seem 
particularly amenable to such exercises: AI-enabled cyber offense 
and defense, and adversarial machine learning. While we highlight 
these subsets because they seem especially relevant to security, 
red teaming of AI technologies more broadly seems generally 
beneficial. In addition to this report and the associated workshop, 
another recent effort aimed at this goal was also conducted by the 
Origins Project earlier this year .
In the case of cyber attacks, many of the concerns discussed 
earlier in this document, and elsewhere in the literature, are 
hypothetical. Conducting deliberate red team exercises might be 
useful in the AI/cybersecurity domain, analogous to the DARPA 
Cyber Grand Challenge but across a wider range of attacks (e.g. 
including social engineering, and vulnerability exploitation beyond 
memory attacks), in order to better understand the skill levels 
required to carry out certain attacks and defenses, and how well 
they work in practice.
Likewise, in the case of adversarial machine learning, while there 
are many theoretical papers showing the vulnerabilities of machine 
learning systems to attack, the systematic and ongoing stress-
testing of real-world AI systems has only just begun . Efforts like 
the CleverHans library of benchmarks and models are a step in this 
direction , creating the foundation for a distributed open source 
red teaming effort, as is the NIPS 2017 Adversarial Attacks and 
Defenses competition , which is more analogous to the DARPA 
Cyber Grand Challenge.
There are several open questions regarding the use of “red team” 
strategies for mitigating malicious uses of AI:
• What lessons can be learned from the history to date of “red 
team” exercises?
• Is it possible to detect most serious vulnerabilities through “red 
team” exercises, or is the surface area for attack too broad?
1
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• Who should be responsible for conducting such exercises, and 
how could they be incentivised to do so?
• What sorts of skills are required to undermine AI systems, and 
what is the distribution of those skills? To what extent do these 
skills overlap with the skills required to develop and deploy AI 
systems, and how should these findings inform the threat model 
used in red teaming exercises (and other AI security analysis)?
• Are there mechanisms to promote the uptake of lessons from 
“red team” exercises?
• Are there mechanisms to share lessons from “red team” 
exercises with other organizations that may be susceptible to 
similar attacks? How to avoid disclosure of attack methods to 
bad actors?
• What are the challenges and opportunities of extending “red 
teaming” (or related practices like tabletop exercises) to AI 
issues in the physical and political domains? What can be 
learned for the physical domain from physical penetration 
testing exercises?
Formal Verification
Formal verification of software systems has been studied for 
decades . In recent years, it has been shown that even some 
very complex systems are amenable to formal proofs that they 
will operate as intended, including the CompCert compiler and 
the seL4 microkernel . An open question is whether AI systems, 
or elements thereof, are amenable to formal verification. At the 
workshop there was substantial skepticism about the prospects  
for formal AI verification, given the complexity of some modern  
AI systems, but further analysis about the challenges is required, 
and research on the topic continues apace . In particular, we 
might be interested in the following properties being verified for  
a given system:
• that its internal processes in fact attain the goals specified for 
the system (though noting the existence of the specification 
problem, i.e. that desired properties of AI systems are often 
difficult to specify in advance, and therefore difficult to verify),
• that its goals will be remain constant in the face of adversaries 
attempts to change them,
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• that its ability to be deceived with adversarial inputs is bounded 
to some extent.
Verifying Hardware
Given the increasing complexity of AI systems, and in some 
domains limited theoretical foundations for their operation, it may 
be prohibitively expensive, or even practically or theoretically 
impossible, to provide an end-to-end verification framework 
for them. However, it may be feasible to use formal methods to 
improve the security of components of these systems. Hardware 
seems particularly amenable to verification, as formal methods 
have been widely adopted in the hardware industry for decades . 
Verifying Security
Additionally, in recent years formal verification has been applied to 
security protocols to provide robust guarantees of safety against 
certain types of attacks. The JavaScript prover CryptoVerif  is an 
example of a developer-focused tool that allows programmers to 
apply formal methods to their code to check correctness in the 
development process. It should be noted that much of this work 
is still largely theoretical and adoption in the real world has so far 
been limited . 
Verifying AI Functionality
The notion of being able to prove that a system behaves as 
intended is an attractive one for artificial intelligence. However, 
formal methods are difficult to scale up to arbitrary complex 
systems due to the state space explosion problem. Nonetheless, 
verification of some aspects of AI systems, such as image 
classifiers, is still feasible even verification of the behavior of  
the whole system is prohibitively complex. For example, work  
on verification of deep neural networks provided a method  
to check for the existence of adversarial examples in regions  
of the input space .
Responsible “AI 0-Day” Disclosure
As discussed above, despite the successes of contemporary 
machine learning algorithms, it has been shown time and again that 
ML algorithms also have vulnerabilities. These include ML-specific 
vulnerabilities, such as inducing misclassification via adversarial 
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examples  or via poisoning the training data ; see Barreno et al. 
(2010) for a survey. ML algorithms also remain open to traditional 
vulnerabilities, such as memory overflow (Stevens et al., 2016). 
There is currently a great deal of interest among cyber-security 
researchers in understanding the security of ML systems, though 
at present there seem to be more questions than answers.
In the cybersecurity community, “0-days” are software 
vulnerabilities that have not been made publicly known (and thus 
defenders have zero days to prepare for an attack making use of 
them). It is common practice to disclose these vulnerabilities to 
affected parties before publishing widely about them, in order to 
provide an opportunity for a patch to be developed.
Should there be a norm in the AI community for how to disclose 
such vulnerabilities responsibly to affected parties (such as those 
who developed the algorithms, or are using them for commercial 
applications)? This broad question gives rise to additional 
questions for further research:
• As AI technologies become increasingly integrated into 
products and platforms, will the existing security norm  
around responsible disclosure extend to AI technologies  
and communities?
• Should AI systems (both existing and future) be presumed 
vulnerable until proven secure, to an extent that disclosing new 
vulnerabilities privately is unnecessary?
• In what safety-critical contexts are AI systems currently  
being used?
• Which empirical findings in AI would be useful in informing 
an appropriate disclosure policy (analogous to the way that 
historical trends in 0-day discoveries and exploitation rates are 
discussed in cybersecurity analyses )?
• If such a norm were appropriate in broad terms, who should be 
notified in case a vulnerability is found, how much notice should 
be given before publication, and what mechanisms should 
institutions create to ensure a recommendation is processed 
and potentially acted upon?
• What is the equivalent of “patching” for AI systems, and how 
should trade-offs (e.g. between resource demands, accuracy 
and robustness to noise) and prioritization amongst the variety 
of possible defense measures be weighed in a world of rapidly 
changing attacks and defenses?
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AI-Specific Exploit Bounties
To complement the norm of responsible disclosure of 
vulnerabilities (discussed above), which relies on social incentives 
and goodwill, some software vendors offer financial incentives 
(cash bounties) to anyone who detects and responsibly discloses 
a vulnerability in their products. With the emergence of new AI-
specific vulnerabilities, some questions arise:
• Are existing vulnerability bounties likely to extend to AI 
technologies?
• Should we expect, or encourage, AI vendors to offer bounties 
for AI-specific exploits?
• Is there scope to offer bounties by third parties (e.g. 
government, NGO, or philanthropic source) in cases where 
vendors are unwilling or unable to offer them, for example in 
the case of popular machine learning frameworks developed as 
open-source projects or in academia?
Security Tools
In the same way software development and deployment tools 
have evolved to include an increasing array of security-related 
capabilities (testing, fuzzing, anomaly detection, etc.), could 
we start envisioning tools to test and improve the security of AI 
components and systems integrated with AI components during 
development and deployment, such that they are less amenable to 
attack? These could include:
• Automatic generation of adversarial data
• Tools for analysing classification errors
• Automatic detection of attempts at remote model extraction or 
remote vulnerability scanning
• Automatic suggestions for improving model robustness (see e.g. 
Koh and Liang (2017) for related ideas)
1 see e.g. Kesarwani et al., 2017
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Secure Hardware
Hardware innovation has accelerated the pace of innovation in 
machine learning, by allowing more complex models to be trained, 
enabling faster execution of existing models, and facilitating more 
rapid iteration of possible models. In some cases, this hardware is 
generic (commercial GPUs), but increasingly, AI (and specifically 
machine learning) systems are trained and run on hardware that 
is semi-specialized (e.g. graphics processing units (GPUs)) or 
fully specialized (e.g. Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)). This 
specialization could make it much more feasible to develop and 
distribute secure hardware for AI-specific applications than it 
would be to develop generic secure hardware and cause it to be 
widely used.
At the workshop we explored the potential value of adding security 
features to AI-specific hardware. For example, it may be possible to 
create secure AI hardware that would prevent copying a trained AI 
model off a chip without the original copy first being deleted. Such 
a feature could be desirable so that the total number of AI systems 
(in general or of a certain type or capability level) could be tightly 
controlled, if the capabilities of such AI systems would be harmful 
in the wrong hands, or if a large-scale diffusion of such AI systems 
could have harmful economic, social or political effects.
Other desirable secure hardware features include hardware-
level access restrictions and audits. One research trajectory to 
be considered is developing a reference model for secure AI-
specific hardware, which could then be used to inform hardware 
engineering and, ultimately, be adopted by hardware providers. It 
may also be the case that potential security threats from AI will 
drive research in secure hardware more generally, not just for the 
hardware running AI systems, as a response measure to changes 
in the cyber threat landscape. Note, however, the potential for 
manufacturers to undermine the security of the hardware they 
produce; hardware supply chain vulnerabilities are currently a 
concern in the cybersecurity context, where there is fear that 
actors with control over a supply chain may introduce hardware-
based vulnerabilities in order to surveil more effectively or 
sabotage cyber-physical systems .
Finally, note that for other security-relevant domains such as 
cryptography, tamper-proof hardware has been developed , with 
features such as tamper evidence (making it clear that tampering 
has occurred when it has occurred) and obscurity of layout design 
(such that it is prohibitively difficult to physically examine the 
workings of the chip in order to defeat it). Tamper-proof hardware 
could potentially be valuable so that outsiders are unable to 
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discern the inner workings of an AI system from external emission; 
so that stolen hardware cannot be used to duplicate an AI; and so 
that organizations can credibly commit to operating a system in a 
safe and beneficial way by hard-coding certain software properties 
in a chip that, if tampered with, would break down. However, 
secure processors tend to cost significantly more than insecure 
processors  and, to our knowledge, have not specifically been 
developed for AI purposes.
There are many open questions in this domain:
• What, if any, are the specific security requirements of AI 
systems, in general and in different domains of application?
• Would changes in the risk landscape (as surveyed above) 
provide sufficient incentive for a major overhaul of hardware 
security?
• What set of measures (e.g. reference implementation) would 
encourage adoption of secure hardware?
• What measures, if any, are available to ensure compliance 
with hardware safety requirements given the international 
distribution of vendors and competing incentives such as cost, 
potential for surveillance and legal implications of auditability?
• How applicable are existing secure processor designs to the 
protection of AI systems from tampering?
• Could/should AI-specific secure processors be developed?
• How could secure enclaves be implemented in an AI context ?
• Can secure processors be made affordable, or could policy 
mechanisms be devised to incentivize their use even in the face 
of a cost premium?
Pre-Publication Risk Assessment in Technical Areas  
of Special Concern
By pre-publication risk assessment we mean analyzing the 
particular risks (or lack thereof) of a particular capability if it 
became widely available, and deciding on that basis whether, and 
to what extent, to publish it. Such norms are already widespread 
in the computer security community, where e.g. proofs of concept 
rather than fully working exploits are often published. Indeed, such 
considerations are sufficiently widespread in computer security 
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that they are highlighted as criteria for submission to prestigious 
conferences .
Openness is not a binary variable: today, many groups will 
publish the source code of a machine learning algorithm without 
specifying the hyperparameters to get it to work effectively, or 
will reveal details of research but not give details on one particular 
component that could be part of a crucial data ingestion (or 
transformation) pipeline. On the spectrum from a rough idea, to 
pseudocode, to a trained model along with source code and 
tutorials/tips on getting it to work well in practice, there are various 
possible points, and perhaps there are multiple axes (see Figure 3 ). 
Generally speaking, the less one shares, the higher the skill and 
computational requirements there are for another actor to recreate 
a given level of capability with what is shared: this reduces the risk 
of malicious use, but also slows down research and places barriers 
on legitimate applications.
For an example of a potentially abusable capability where full 
publication may be deemed too risky, voice synthesis for a 
given target speaker (as will reportedly soon be available as a 
service from the company Lyrebird ) is ripe for potential criminal 
applications, like automated spearphishing (see digital security 
section) and disinformation (see political security section). On the 
other hand, as is the case with other technologies with significant 
potential for malicious use, there could be value in openness for 
security research, for example in white hat penetration testing.
As described in the Rethinking Openness section of the report, 
there are clear benefits to the level of openness currently prevalent 
in machine learning as a field. The extent to which restrictions 
on publication would affect these benefits should be carefully 
considered. If the number of restricted publications is very small 
(as in biotechnology, for example), this may not be a significant 
concern. If, however, restricted publication becomes common, as 
in the case of vulnerability disclosure in cybersecurity research, 
then institutions would need to be developed to balance the 
needs of all affected parties. For example, responsible disclosure 
mechanisms in cybersecurity allow researchers and affected 
vendors to negotiate a period of time for a discovered vulnerability 
to be patched before the vulnerability is published. In addition 
to the commercial interests of vendors and the security needs of 
users, such schemes often also protect researchers from legal 
action by vendors. In the case of AI, one can imagine coordinating 
institutions that will withhold publication until appropriate safety 
measures, or means of secure deployment, can be developed, 
while allowing the researchers to retain priority claims and gain 
credit for their work. Some AI-related discoveries, as in the case of 
1
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Figure 3. A schematic illustration of the relationship between  
openness about an AI capability and the skill required  
to reproduce that capability.
Decreasing skill requirement
Vague description
of achievement
Pseudocode
Source code,
trained models,
tutorials
Increasing openness
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adversarial examples in the wild, may be subsumed under existing 
responsible disclosure mechanisms, as we discuss below in 
“Responsible AI 0-day Disclosure”.
Some valuable questions for future research related to pre-
publication research assessment include:
• What sorts of pre-publication research assessment would AI 
researchers be willing to consider? To what extent would this be 
seen as conflicting with norms around openness?
• What can be learned from pre-publication risk assessment 
mechanisms in other scientific/technological domains?
• Is it possible to say, in advance and with high confidence, what 
sorts of capabilities are ripe for abuse?
• What sort of heuristics may be appropriate for weighing the 
pros and cons of opening up potentially-abusable capabilities?
• How can such assessment be incorporated into decision-
making (e.g. informing one’s openness choices, or incorporating 
such analysis into publications)?
• Can we say anything fine-grained yet generalizable about the 
levels of skill and computational resources required to recreate 
capabilities from a given type (code, pseudocode, etc.) of 
shared information?
• How does the community adopt such a model in the absence of 
regulation?
Central Access Licensing Models
Another potential model for openness is the use of what we call 
central access licensing. In this model, users are able to access 
certain capabilities in a central location, such as a collection of 
remotely accessible secure, interlinked data centers, while the 
underlying code is not shared, and terms and conditions apply 
to the use of the capabilities. This model, which is increasingly 
adopted in industry for AI-based services such as sentiment 
analysis and image recognition, can place limits on the malicious 
use of the underlying AI technologies. For example, limitations on 
the speed of use can be imposed, potentially preventing some 
large-scale harmful applications, and terms and conditions can 
explicitly prohibit malicious use, allowing clear legal recourse.
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Centralised access provides an alternative to publication that 
allows universal access to a certain capability, while keeping the 
underlying technological breakthroughs away from bad actors 
(though also from well-intentioned researchers). Note though that 
black box model extraction  may allow bad actors to gain access to 
the underlying technology.
Additionally, similarly to early proposals for, in effect, an 
information processing “tax” on emails in order to disincentivize 
spam , centralized AI infrastructures better enable constraints to 
be placed on the use of AI services, such that large-scale attacks 
like automated spear phishing could be made less economical 
(though see Laurie and Clayton, 2004 for a criticism of this 
approach, and Liu and Camp, 2006 for further discussion; the 
increased interest in crypto-economics following the success of 
bitcoin may lead to advances in this area).
Finally, note that the concentration of AI services in a particular set 
of organizations may heighten potential for malicious use at those 
organizations, including by those acting with the blessing of the 
relevant organization as well as by insider threats. Indeed, some 
workshop attendees considered these risks from concentration 
of power to be the biggest threat from AI technologies; note, 
however, that in this report we have decided to focus on direct 
malicious use risks, rather than systemic threats (see Scope). In 
addition to monopolistic behavior, there are more subtle risks such 
as the introduction of “backdoors” into machine learning systems 
that users may be unaware of .
Some initial research questions that arise related to a central 
access licensing model:
• What sorts of services might one want only available on a  
per-use basis?
• How effectively can a service provider determine whether AI 
uses are malicious?
• How can a user determine whether a service provider is 
malicious ?
• Is the proposal technologically, legally and politically feasible?
• Who might object to a centralised access model and on what 
grounds?
• Is there enough of a technology gap such that actors without 
access cannot develop the technologies independently?
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• What are potential risks and downsides to centralised access, 
e.g. in aggravating political security risks?
• How effective can black box model extraction be in  
different contexts?
• How useful are limits on the amount or frequency of queries  
to models as a countermeasure against model inversion 
(extracting the training data from the model; Fredrikson  
et al., 2015) and other forms of attack such as membership 
inference (ascertaining whether certain data is contained  
in the training data )?
• What would be the associated trade-offs of such limits?
• (How) can cloud providers vet the safety or security of AI 
systems without inspecting their internal workings, if such 
information is private?
• Are cloud computing providers sufficiently flexible in their 
services to allow the experimentation required by researchers, 
or would this intervention be most applicable to preventing 
potentially harmful dissemination trained AI systems?
Sharing Regimes that Favor Safety and Security
One possible approach for reducing security risks of AI is to 
selectively share certain capability information and data with 
trusted parties. A somewhat analogous approach is used in the 
cyber domain — Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) 
and Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) — 
where companies share information about cyber attacks amongst 
themselves. Antivirus and large tech companies themselves 
serve as points of concentration of knowledge sharing, giving 
them advantages over other kinds of actors. In the case of AI, 
one might imagine an arrangement where some particularly 
powerful or hazardous capabilities (e.g. ones that lend themselves 
straightforwardly to automated hacking) are shared only with 
organizations or individuals that meet certain criteria, such as 
having established safety and security routines, or agreeing to 
random inspection by other members of the group, or a third-party 
agency that the group has mutually agreed has oversight and 
inspection powers over them.
Such an approach might be valuable for facilitating collaborative 
analysis of safety and security issues, and thus getting some 
fraction of the benefit of an open source approach (where an 
even larger number of “eyes” are on the problem), while reducing 
1 Shokri et al., 2016
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some risks associated with diffusion. If, based on such analysis, it 
is concluded that there is no harm in further diffusion, then the 
capabilities would be published.
Several questions arise about the above proposals:
• What have been the benefits and limitations of existing ISACs 
and ISAOs and are elements of such models useful to AI?
• What sorts of criteria might be applied to an organization or 
individual in order to ascertain their trustworthiness to deal with 
particularly sensitive information?
• What types of information might be shared amongst such  
a group?
• Should there be a limited-sharing stage for all AI developments, 
or should capabilities be evaluated individually, and if the latter 
then on what basis?
• What information types should limited sharing apply to: code, 
research papers, informal notes?
• How can sufficient trust be established between groups such 
that this kind of coordination is seen as mutually beneficial?
• Are there any particular incentives which can be created  
that would make this sort of collaboration more likely (for 
instance, the creation of a shared cluster to test a certain kind 
of research on)?
• What are potential risks and downsides to this type of  
sharing regime?
Note that this mechanism has partial overlap with pre-publication 
risk assessment in technical areas of special concern and central 
access licensing model.
Security, Ethics, and Social Impact Education  
for Future Developers
There has recently been discussion of the role of ethics education 
in AI , in light of ongoing public and private discussion of the 
potential and pitfalls of AI. Educational efforts might be beneficial 
in highlighting the risks of malicious applications to AI researchers, 
and fostering preparedness to make decisions about when 
1 Burton et al., 201
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technologies should be open, and how they should be designed, in 
order to mitigate such risks. As yet there is no long-term research 
on the impacts of such educational efforts on AI researchers’ 
career development and eventual decision-making, suggesting 
possible areas for research:
• What are the best practices for ethics and policy education for 
science and engineering in general that are applicable to AI, 
especially around mitigating security risks?
• How can ethics education be designed so as to most effectively 
engage with the interests and concerns of AI developers, rather 
than being seen as merely a box to be ticked off or a burden 
unrelated to one’s practical decision-making, as sometimes 
occurs in other domains ?
• What ought to be included in such a curriculum: ethical 
methodologies, principles and/or theories?
• How could such a curriculum be iterated over time as the state 
of AI and security advances?
• Who would be most effective at providing such a curriculum? 
Should ethics educators from philosophy and other disciplines 
be brought in or is it better for the community to develop its 
own internal capacity to teach AI specific ethics?
Ethics Statements and Standards
Another way of acting on ethical concerns could be multi-
stakeholder conversation to develop ethical standards for the 
development and deployment of AI systems, which could be 
signed on to by companies, research organizations and others 
deploying AI systems. Two examples of such processes are 
the IEEE Global Initiative for Ethical Considerations in Artificial 
Intelligence and Autonomous Systems  and the development of 
the Asilomar AI Principles . Several questions remain open:
• What institutional frameworks are appropriate for ensuring 
that statements and standards concerning ethics are fully 
implemented in order to ensure that they are more than mere 
technological ‘greenwash’? For instance, should community 
developed standards include statements about reporting  
and accountability?
1
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• Should companies and research organizations have a statement 
on ethics, either taken directly from one of these communal 
standards or developed in house for their particular situation? If 
so, how can this be encouraged?
• Are standards and statements of this kind the best way to foster 
industry-wide conversation about the ethics of AI? What are 
some alternatives?
• What processes are appropriate for revising and updating ethics 
statements and standards in order to ensure that they remain 
flexible and can incorporate best practice whilst retaining their 
sense of permanence and objectivity.
Norms, Framings and Social Incentives
As noted in previous sections, there are substantial security risks 
associated with AI, and in some cases one actor could gain from 
exploiting such risks. At the same time, there are also substantial 
upsides to progress in AI research and development, and in many 
cases AI can be used to enhance rather than diminish security. This 
raises the questions like the following:
• How can the upsides of AI development be framed in such a way 
as to galvanize focus on mutually beneficial developments and 
discourage harmful exploitation?
• What are analogous cases from which lessons can be learned, 
where a technology that could have been used and thought 
about in a zero-sum manner was governed in a way that 
benefited all?
• What processes should be allowed to govern the emergence 
and implementation of a normative culture for beneficial AI in 
order both to ensure the creation of strong, enforceable and 
effective norms, and to avoid this normative culture being used 
to preserve rigid and/or biased norms that hamper diversity and 
creativity within the sector?
• What role do diverse normative cultures across fields such as 
AI development, AI safety and risk management play in both 
allowing for a diverse range of perspectives to inform public 
debates about AI and ensuring that more people consider 
themselves to be ‘insiders’ in such debates, and fewer people 
consider themselves to be ‘outsiders’
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Technologically Guaranteed Privacy
Several of the threats within the digital security and political 
security domains (e.g. automated spear phishing, personalised 
propaganda) rely on attackers gaining access to private 
information about individuals. In addition to procedural and 
legal measures to ensure individuals’ privacy, there is increasing 
research on technological tools for guaranteeing user data  
privacy, which may also be applicable in the context of AI systems. 
We highlight two technologies as potentially relevant here: 
differential privacy-guaranteeing algorithms and secure multi- 
party computation. There remain open questions regarding  
both technologies:
• Can algorithmic privacy be combined with AI technologies, 
either in general or in specific domains?
• What are the trade-offs, if any, for implementing algorithmic 
privacy, e.g. in terms of performance or in terms of financial 
viability of services?
• What mechanisms (financial, educational, legal or other) could 
encourage the adoption of algorithmic privacy in AI systems?
• What lessons can be learned by efforts at technologically 
guaranteed privacy (such as Apple’s use of differential privacy)? 
Differential privacy
Many machine learning models are currently being developed 
by companies for commercial use in APIs (see central access 
licensing above). Without precautions it is possible for individuals 
to break anonymity in the underlying dataset of a machine learning 
model that has been deployed for public use via a model inversion 
attack  or membership inference attack . That is, even without 
access to the training data, an attacker can in some cases query  
a model in such a way that information from the underlying data set 
is revealed.
Ji et al. (2014) surveyed methods for providing differential privacy 
in machine learning systems , though they do not address 
differential privacy in neural networks. Such methods have 
been reported by, for example, Abadi et al. (2016). In general, 
differentially private machine learning algorithms combine their 
training data with noise to maintain privacy while minimizing 
effects on performance. Generally, differentially private algorithms 
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lose some performance compared to their non-private equivalents, 
and so privacy may become a concern if the teams developing 
models are not incentivized to keep their datasets private. 
Secure Multi-Party Computation
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) refers to protocols that 
allow multiple parties to jointly compute functions, while keeping 
each party’s input to the function private . For instance, one 
simple MPC protocol allows users to jointly compute the outcome 
of a vote, without sharing their individual votes with one another.
As an important practical application, MPC protocols make it 
possible to train machine learning systems on sensitive data 
without significantly compromising its privacy . For example, 
medical researchers could train a system on confidential patient 
records by engaging in an MPC protocol with the hospital that 
possesses them. A technology company could similarly learn from 
users’ data, in some cases, without needing to access this data.
An active open source development effort (OpenMined) is 
currently aiming to develop a platform to allow users to sell others 
the right to train machine learning systems on their data using 
MPC . A number of other frameworks for privacy-preserving 
machine-learning have also been proposed . 
In addition, MPC opens up new opportunities for privacy-
preserving web applications and cloud computation. For example, 
one company may develop machine learning models that can make 
predictions based on health data. If individuals do not want to 
send this company copies of their personal medical data, they may 
instead opt to engage in an MPC protocol with the company, and 
in particular an MPC protocol where only the individual receives 
the output. At no point in this process does the company gain any 
knowledge about the individual’s medical data; nevertheless, it is 
still able to provide its service.
MPC could also help to enable privacy-preserving surveillance . 
To the extent that AI systems play active roles surveillance, for 
instance by recognizing faces in videos or flagging suspicious 
individuals on the basis of their web activity, MPC can be used  
to increase individual privacy. In particular, MPC makes it possible 
to operate such systems without needing to collect or access 
the (often sensitive) data that is being used to make the relevant 
classifications.
At the same time, the use of MPC protocols remains limited by the 
fact that, in many cases, they can increase overhead associated 
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with a computation by multiple orders of magnitude. This means 
that MPC is best-suited for relatively simple computations or for 
use cases where increased privacy would be especially valuable.
 
Monitoring Resources
One type of measure that might help to predict and/or prevent 
misuse of AI technology would be to monitor inputs to AI systems. 
Such monitoring regimes are well-established in the context 
of other potentially dangerous technologies, most notably the 
monitoring of fissile materials and chemical production facilities 
for the purpose of implementing nuclear and chemical weapon 
agreements. An obvious example of an input that might be possible 
to monitor is computing hardware. While efforts have been made 
in the past to survey computing resources , there is no major 
ongoing public effort to do so, with the best available information 
likely withheld due to commercial or state secrecy. One possible 
benefit to having a public, or semi-public, database of the global 
distribution of computing resources could be to better understand 
the likely distribution of offensive and defensive AI/cybersecurity 
capabilities. Additionally, having such monitoring in place would 
be valuable if stronger measures were to be employed, e.g. 
enforceable limitations on how hardware could be used. Questions 
for further consideration include:
• How feasible would it be to monitor global computing 
resources?
• Are different domains more or less tractable to monitor, or more 
or less important for AI capabilities, than others (e.g. should 
video game consoles be considered, in light of their large share 
in total computing  but limited current role in AI)?
• What could be done with such information?
• Are there drawbacks to such an effort (e.g. in encouraging 
wasteful “racing” to have the most computing power)?
• Would other AI inputs be better suited to monitoring than 
computing resources?
Exploring Legal and Regulatory Interventions
Much of the discussion above focuses on interventions that 
can be carried out by researchers and practitioners within the 
AI development community. However, there is a broader space 
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of possible interventions, including legal ones, that should be 
considered. We note that ill-considered government interventions 
could be counterproductive, and that it is important that the 
implications of any specific policy interventions in this area should 
be carefully analyzed. A number of questions concerning the 
proper scope for government intervention in AI security arise; we 
list some initial examples here:
• Is there a clear chain of responsibility for preventing AI security-
related problems?
• Which government departments, marketplace actors or other 
institutions would ideally have what responsibilities, and 
what would the interactions with the academic and industry 
communities be?
• How suitable would existing institutions be at playing this 
role, and how much will it require the establishment of new 
institutions founded on novel principles or innovative structures 
in order to effectively operate in such an evolving and technical 
field?
• Are relevant actors speaking to each other, and coordinating 
sufficiently, especially across political, legal, cultural and 
linguistic barriers?
• Are liability regimes adequate? Do they provide the right 
incentives for various actors to take competent defensive 
measures?
• How prepared does e.g. the US government feel, and how much 
appetite would there be for focused offices/channels designed 
to increase awareness and expertise?
• Should governments hold developers, corporations, or 
others liable for the malicious use of AI technologies (or, 
explicitly make them exempt from such liability )? What other 
approaches might be considered for pricing AI security-related 
externalities ?
• What are the pros and cons of government policies requiring 
the use of privacy-preserving machine learning systems or 
defenses against adversarial examples and other forms of 
malicious use?
• Are data poisoning and adversarial example attacks aimed at 
disrupting AI systems subject to the same legal penalties as 
traditional forms of hacking? If not, should they be (and how 
1
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can legal but related tactics like search engine optimization be 
dealt with if so)?
• Should international agreements be considered as tools to 
incentivize collaboration on AI security?
• What should the AI security community’s “public policy model” 
be - that is, how should we aim to affect government policy, 
what should the scope of that policy be, and how should 
responsibility be distributed across individuals, organizations, 
and governments?
• Should there be a requirement for non-human systems 
operating online or otherwise interacting with humans (for 
example, over the telephone) to identify themselves as such (a 
“Blade Runner law” ) to increase political security?
• What kind of process can be used when developing policies 
and laws to govern a dynamically evolving and unpredictable 
research and development environment?
• How desirable is it that community norms, ethical standards, 
public policies and laws all say the same thing and how much 
is to be gained from different levels of governance to respond 
to different kinds of risk (e.g. near term/long term, technical 
safety / bad actor and high uncertainty / low uncertainty risks)?
It seems unlikely that interventions within the AI development 
community and those within other institutions, including policy 
and legal institutions, will work well over the long term unless 
there is some degree of coordination between these groups. 
Ideally discussions about AI safety and security from within the 
AI community should be informing legal and policy interventions, 
and there should also be a willingness amongst legal and policy 
institutions to devolve some responsibility for AI safety to the 
AI community, as well as seeking to intervene on its own behalf. 
Achieving this is likely to require both a high degree of trust 
between the different groups involved in the governance of AI and 
a suitable channel to facilitate proactive collaboration in developing 
norms, ethics education and standards, policies and laws; in 
contrast, different sectors responding reactively to the different 
kinds of pressures that they each face at different times seems 
likely to result in clumsy, ineffective responses from the policy and 
technical communities alike. These considerations motivated our 
Recommendations #1 and #2.
1 Wu, 2017
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